Optimal Tax Administration

By Michael Keen, Joel B. Slemrod. Social Science Research Network, 2017

194 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper sets out a framework for analyzing optimal interventions by a tax administration, one that parallels and can be closely integrated with established frameworks for thinking about optimal tax policy. Its key contribution is the development of a summary measure of the impact of administrative interventions—the “enforcement elasticity of tax revenue”—that is a sufficient statistic for the behavioral response to such interventions, much as the elasticity of taxable income serves as a sufficient statistic for the response to tax rates. Among the applications are characterizations of the optimal balance between policy and administrative measures, and of the optimal compliance gap.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Gender Studies

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/5491168a9a54218666d1550cd6e80044c0bf69ec

Citations in the corpus

• How to Improve Tax Compliance? Evidence from Population-Wide Experiments in Belgium (2019, unknown): “In its wake, a large body of research has stressed the role of nonpecuniary motives more broadly (e.g., Kirchler 2007; Luttmer and Singhal 2014; Besley, Jensen, and Persson 2019), often referred to as “taxmorale.””