Does Good Corporate Governance Reduce Information Asymmetry Around Quarterly Earnings Announcements
By Kiridaran Kanagaretnam, Gerald J. Lobo, Dennis J. Whalen. 2007
394 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/546d4e30b6b35a01ca574c3ea92621a504533f4b
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Citations in the corpus
- Corporate social responsibility, real activities earnings management, and corporate governance: evidence from Korea (2016, background): “A majority of CG-EM studies show that CG plays an important role in constraining EM by monitoring managers’ opportunistic behavior (Chen, Elder, and Hsieh 2007; Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Whalen 2007; Lin and Hwang 2010).”
- Corporate board characteristics and environmental disclosure quantity: Evidence from South Africa (integrated reporting) and Nigeria (traditional reporting) (2018, background): “Also, competent corporate governance is capable of reducing information asymmetry (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Whalen, 2007).”
- Does Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards Reduce Information Asymmetry in Equity Markets? * (2017, background): “Previous apers have analysed the relationship between the quality f corporate governance and the information environment of rms in the stock market around different corporate events e.g. Cai et al., 2006; Kanagaretnam et al., 2007).”
- How do the ownership structure and board of directors' features impact earnings management? The Spanish case (2020, result): “This argument is consistent with the hypothesis that firms with higher levels of corporate governance have lower information asymmetry and better earnings quality (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, & Whalen, 2007).”
- Corporate governance and social responsibility (2015, background): “For example, there is less information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements (Kanagaretnam et al., 2007), and the quality of information available to financial analysts increases with higher levels of corporate governance (Byard et al.”