Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation
By R. La Porta, Florencio Lopez‐de‐Silanes, A. Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. 2002
4,352 citations recorded by the source corpus.
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-f low ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cashf low ownership by the controlling shareholder. RECENT RESEARCH SUGGESTS THAT THE EXTENT of legal protection of investors in a country is an important determinant of the development of its financial markets. Where laws are protective of outside investors and well enforced, investors are willing to finance firms, and financial markets are both broader and more valuable. In contrast, where laws are unprotective of investors, the development of financial markets is stunted. Moreover, systematic differences among countries in the structure of laws and their enforcement, such as the historical origin of their laws, account for the differences in financial development ~La Porta et al. ~1997, 1998!!. How does better protection of outside investors ~both shareholders and creditors! promote financial market development? When their rights are better protected by the law, outside investors are willing to pay more for financial assets such as equity and debt. They pay more because they recognize that, with better legal protection, more of the firm’s profits would come back to them as interest or dividends as opposed to being expropriated by the entrepreneur who controls the firm. By limiting expropriation, the law raises the price that securities fetch in the marketplace. In turn, this enables more entrepreneurs to finance their investments externally, leading to the expansion of financial markets. Although the ultimate benefit of legal investor protection for financial development has now been well documented, the effect of protection on valuation has received less attention. In this paper, we present a theoretical and empirical analysis of this effect.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/53eb7fe6f70690520db46bea32d389b0539435c7
How researchers see this paper
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In Accounting
- Omrane Guedhami
- Mike W. Peng
- Christian Leuz
- Dev R. Mishra
- Sadok El Ghoul
- Ross Levine
- René M. Stulz
- Chen Lin
In Economics and Econometrics
- Omrane Guedhami
- Kalina B. Manova
- F. González
- Stijn Claessens
- Luc Laeven
- Thorsten Beck
- Ross Levine
- Dev R. Mishra
Citations in the corpus
- The Rule of Law and Economic Development (2008, background): “Perhaps the most dynamic body of research on the link between the rule of law and economic development has grown out of a series of important papers by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004) and their colleagues (Glaeser & Shleifer 2002; Djankov et al. 2002, 2003) on legal origins.”
- Political Incentives to Suppress Negative Information: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms (2015, background): “8 indirect means (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; LaPorta et al., 2002; Rajan and Zingales, 2003).”
- Determinants of compliance with AAOIFI standards by Islamic banks (2016, neutral): “To develop our research hypotheses, we review prior research which suggests an association between corporate disclosure and certain corporate governance mechanisms (La Porta et al., 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003).”
- Governance and Bank Valuation (2004, positive): “Research suggests that strong shareholder protection laws increase firm valuations (Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al., 2002).”
- Earnings and capital management and signaling: the use of loan-loss provisions by European banks (2015, background): “Furthermore, we also analyze the relationship between the country level of protection of creditors’ rights (La Porta et al. 2002) and bank practice of income smoothing.”
- Ambiguity and Nonparticipation: The Role of Regulation (2009, background): “Recently, a large empirical literature has developed highlighting the interactions of law and finance (see, for example, La Porta et al. 1997, 2000). A variety of authors have shown that factors such as bankruptcy provisions, minority voting rules, corporate governance requirements, and judicial eff”
- Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: A Survey of Literature (2013, background): “Corporate governance is also a set of mechanisms by which outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by insiders (La Porta et al., 2002).”
- Corporate Governance Index, Firm Valuation and Performance in Brazil (2005, methodology): “Shleifer and Vishny (1997), La Porta et al. (1998, 1999, 2000, 2002), Morck et al. (1988) and Claessens et al. (2000a,b) studied the conflicts of interestbetween large and small shareholders.”
- Governance of Family Firms (2015, background): “There is significant empirical evidence for these claims (e.g., La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 2002), although very little that is specific to family firms.”