Corporate Boards, Audit Committees, and Earnings Management: Pre- and Post-SOX Evidence

By Aloke Ghosh, Antonio Marra, Doo-cheol Moon. 2010

257 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/537ba76787163920814e20026ee53d804f0cfb89

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Lara Al-Haddad
2. Mark R. Whittington
3. Martin Walker
4. A. Gerged
5. K. Hussainey

In Strategy and Management

1. Lara Al-Haddad
2. Mark R. Whittington
3. Martin Walker
4. A. Gerged

Citations in the corpus

• The impact of corporate governance mechanisms on real and accrual earnings management practices: evidence from Jordan (2019, result): “Previous AEM empirical results appear to be inconclusive with Klein (2002), Peasnell et al. (2005) and Ghosh et al. (2010) finding larger boards effective in constraining EM, but others, including Rahman and Ali (2006) and Ball and Shivakumar (2008), concluding the reverse.”
• How far can we trust earnings numbers? What research tells us about earnings management (2013, background): “Unlike Hutton et al. (2009) and Ghosh et al. (2010) find no evidence of an overall reduction in absolute DACCs following SOX.”
• Corporate Governance, Islamic Governance and Earnings Management in Oman: A New Empirical Insights from a Behavioural Theoretical Framework (2017, unknown): “Despite these differences in CG arrangements around the world, existing studies have focused disproportionately on evaluating the effect of Anglo-American CG mechanisms on EM to the neglect of the others (Epps & Ismail, 2009; Ghosh et al., 2010; Lo et al., 2010; Bekiris & Doukakis, 2011; Alves, 2012”