Risks and Redistribution

By Philipp Rehm. 2009

421 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: General Health Professions, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/51ca557fcb1ec7b1b5b52a2671ce105b207b07c9

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In General Health Professions

In Political Science and International Relations

Citations in the corpus

Economic grievances and political protest (2018, background): “In the comparative political economy literature, similar conceptualisations of relative economic hardship have been applied to measuring insecurity and labour market disadvantage (Rehm 2009, 2011; Schwander & H äusermann 2013).”
High-skilled outsiders? Labor market vulnerability, education and welfare state preferences (2015, background): “…situation in the labor market and their preferences for social policy has become a crucial area of research over the past years (Rueda, 2007; Rehm, 2009; Margalit, 2013), especially as labor market risks are increasingly unequally distributed between labor market insiders and outsiders…”
Social Policy by Popular Demand (2011, methodology): “This dichotomization not only increases interpersonal 34 Rehm 2005; Rehm 2009.”
Age-Based Self-Interest, Intergenerational Solidarity and the Welfare State: A Comparative Analysis of Older People’s Attitudes Towards Public Childcare in 12 OECD Countries (2010, neutral): “In this framework, attitudes towards the welfare state are interpreted as a derivative of either one’s current material situation or of the anticipated risks that one may encounter over the life course, such as labour market risks (Cusack et al. 2006; Iversen & Soskice 2001; Kitschelt & Rehm 2006; R”
Labour Market Disadvantage, Political Orientations and Voting: How Adverse Labour Market Experiences Translate into Electoral Behaviour (2015, background): “Second, political economists typically disregard effects on citizens’ involvement, but analyse whether and how labour market disadvantage affects support for redistribution, social protection and left parties (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Cusack et al., 2006; Rehm, 2009).”
Globalization and the Welfare State. Testing the Microfoundations of the Compensation Hypothesis (2010, background): “On the micro-level, however, Rehm (2009, 2007) does not find any evidence that individuals employed in tradables sectors or in industries with a comparative disadvantage are more amenable towards redistribution.”
The decline of the working-class vote, the reconfiguration of the welfare support coalition and consequences for the welfare state (2015, background): “Recent work on occupational risk and the insurance functions of the welfare state continues to focus on unemployment-related policies, which are particularly crucial to those with specific skills or occupational risks (e.g. Bonoli, 2010; Gingrich and Ansell, 2012; Rehm, 2009; Rueda, 2007).”
Mecro-Economic Voting: Local Information and Micro-Perceptions of the Macro-Economy (2014, positive): “Moreover, while perceptions of unemployment by occupation or sector would likely be of great interest (Rehm, 2009, forthcoming), the CCES does not contain such data.”
Inequality, Labor Market Segmentation, and Preferences for Redistribution (2017, neutral): “…is targeted to those without income, it also redistributes, so preferences for social insurance are related to preferences for redistribution.2 Rehm (2009, 2010) has convincingly argued that when the risk distribution is right-skewed, an increase in its dispersion will reduce median voter…”
Public opinion on policy and budgetary trade-offs in European welfare states: evidence from a new comparative survey (2017, background): “…for different social policies largely depends on selfinterest (e.g., Busemeyer et al. 2009; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Lynch and Myrskylä 2009; Rehm 2009; Svallfors 2004), e.g., pensioners are more likely to support generous public pensions and the unemployed would be expected to demand more…”
The effect of macroeconomic and social conditions on the demand for redistribution: A pseudo panel approach (2013, background): “Individual-level theories in political sociology often point to ideology or self-interest as the driving forces behind between observable differences in the demand for redistribution (Bowles and Gintis, 2000; Rehm, 2009).”