Decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program

By E. Galasso, M. Ravallion. 2005

472 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/09b45773753a37f85898b6a9b1ce3c867a8ce1a2

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Antonio Estache
2. M. Ravallion
3. Benjamin A. Olken
4. Francisco H. G. Ferreira
5. P. Bardhan
6. Dominique van de Walle
7. J. Faguet
8. Abhijit Banerjee

In Safety Research

1. Dominique van de Walle
2. R. Mu
3. Antonio Estache
4. M. Ravallion
5. Benjamin A. Olken
6. Francisco H. G. Ferreira
7. R. Gaiha
8. Rema Hanna

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Francisco H. G. Ferreira
2. Antonio Estache
3. M. Ravallion
4. Rema Hanna
5. Abhijit Banerjee
6. Dominique van de Walle
7. Benjamin A. Olken
8. P. Bardhan

Citations in the corpus

• Community-Based Development and Poverty Alleviation: an Evaluation of China's Poor Village Investment Program (2010, unknown): “Frequently, evaluations rely 2 Galasso and Ravallion (2005) find that decentralized allocation by villages to households within the village was more pro-poor than government allocations of the subsidies across villages.”
• Who is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania (2011, unknown): “improved targeting toward the poor in Albania and Bolivia respectively, while in Bangladesh’s decentralized Food-for-Education Program, within village allocation of funds appeared more pro-poor than allocation across villages (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005).”
• Decentralization, Corruption And Government Accountability: An Overview (2005, background): “Galasso and Ravallion (2005) study levels of pro-poor targeting achieved by a decentralized food-foreducation (FFE) program in Bangladesh.”
• Corruption and the costs of redistribution: Micro evidence from Indonesia (2006, result): “14 This finding is consistent with the results of Galasso and Ravallion (2005), who found that, in the Bangladesh Food-for-Education program, local autonomy created only mildly pro-poor targeting.”
• A poor means test? Econometric targeting in Africa (2016, background): “Also see Galasso and Ravallion (2005) and Ravallion (2009) on the properties of this measure and the discussions in Stifel and Alderman (2005) and Stoeffler et al. (2016).”
• Decentralization and access to social services in Colombia (2009, unknown): “improves local information or abets elite capture. Galasso and Ravallion (2005) use household”
• Inequality Is Bad for the Poor (2005, background): “…development have held promise but need careful monitoring and evaluation, recognizing the likely heterogeneity in performance across different institutional settings depending on how successful local elites are in capturing the gains (Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Galasso and Ravallion, 2005).”
• The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization: A Survey (2015, unknown): “Galasso and Ravallion (2005) find that Bangladesh’s food-for-education program became more pro-poor with decentralization, while Bardhan and Mookherjee (2003) conclude that decentralized management advanced poverty alleviation goals in West Bengal in India.”
• ''Capture'' of anti-poverty programs: An analysis of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program in India § (2009, background): “We also find evidence of complementarity between NREGP and the Public Distribution System (PDS).5 This result stands in contrast to that of Galasso and Ravallion (2005) who report evidence of substitution between programs in Bangladesh.”