Practical Dynamic Searchable Encryption with Small Leakage
By Emil Stefanov, Charalampos Papamanthou, Elaine Shi. Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 2014
653 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4f17ca47b98f85b7a15e2417f1a7479d9acfcc98
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Raphael Bost
- Lei Yang
- O. Ohrimenko
- Brice Minaud
- Carl A. Gunter
- Manoj M. Prabhakaran
- Muhammad Naveed
- Jonathan Katz
In Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
- Raphael Bost
- Lei Yang
- O. Ohrimenko
- Brice Minaud
- Muhammad Naveed
- Manoj M. Prabhakaran
- Carl A. Gunter
- Jonathan Katz
Citations in the corpus
- Security and Privacy in the Internet of Things (2017, background): “Since then, several schemes [94, 93, 118, 47, 81, 135] about dynamic SSE have been proposed, among which [94, 93, 118, 47] fail to provide forward privacy.”
- Leakage-Abuse Attacks Against Searchable Encryption (2015, neutral): “A long line of work follows in this vein [3, 4, 6, 10–13, 15, 16, 20].”
- Dynamic Searchable Encryption via Blind Storage (2014, methodology): “In building the SSE scheme, the search index entries for all the keywords are stored as individual files in the Blind Storage scheme (with care taken to facilitate updates).”
- ∑oφoς: Forward Secure Searchable Encryption (2016, methodology): “Verifiable SSE schemes ( i.e. secure against an active adversary) have been studied by Kurosawa and Ohtaki [KO12], and efficient and dynamic constructions have been recently proposed by Bost et al. [BFP16], including a forward private one derived from [SPS14].”
- Forward and Backward Private Searchable Encryption from Constrained Cryptographic Primitives (2017, methodology): “Informally, an SSE scheme is backward-private (or backward-secure) if, whenever a keyword/document pair ( w, ind ) is added into the database and then deleted, subsequent Search queries on w do not reveal ind [SPS14].”
- All Your Queries Are Belong to Us: The Power of File-Injection Attacks on Searchable Encryption (2016, background): “…and focusing on singlekeyword search for simplicity, current state-of-the-art schemes leak mainly two things: the query pattern (i.e., when a query is repeated) and the file-access pattern (namely, which files are returned in response to each query); these are collectively called L1 leakage in [4].”