Secure control against replay attacks

By Yilin Mo, Bruno Sinopoli. Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, 2009

922 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Control and Systems Engineering

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4ec6e2b96ee42346520a10382c68ee32c7171df1

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In Computer Networks and Communications

In Control and Systems Engineering

Citations in the corpus

Attack models and scenarios for networked control systems (2012, methodology): “Attack policy Similar to the work in [14], assuming R(·) C = R(·) I , meaning that the attacker can corrupt the digital channels from which”
On the Performance Analysis of Resilient Networked Control Systems Under Replay Attacks (2013, background): “Th e paper [19] studies the detection of the replay attacks, which maliciously repeat transmitted data.”
A Roadmap Toward the Resilient Internet of Things for Cyber-Physical Systems (2018, background): “• Network Layer: W.r.t. security, this is the most vulnerable layer in a CPS because of the vast possibilities of attacks on communication networks which emerged over the years [63–66].”
Secure Control Systems: A Quantitative Risk Management Approach (2015, methodology): “The outcome from the risk assessment methods may be used for risk treatment, which is also discussed in this article and related to previous work for static and dynamic systems, [18], [28], [29] and [19], [30], respectively.”
Revealing stealthy attacks in control systems (2012, methodology): “In essence, this approach is similar to the method proposed in [12] to detect replay attacks, in which an auxiliary signal unknown to the attacker is used to excite the system.”
Towards an Analysis of Security Issues, Challenges, and Open Problems in the Internet of Things (2015, background): “Efficient protocol to eliminate message replay is presented in [21], [22].”
The Cybersecurity Landscape in Industrial Control Systems (2016, background): “These results are applicable to stealthy [141], replay [142], and FDI attacks.”
A Survey of Physics-Based Attack Detection in Cyber-Physical Systems (2018, methodology): “Attack Detection: The work of Mo et al. [74–76] considers embedding a watermark in the control signal, by injecting random noise from a known distribution.”
A Survey on Internet of Things: Architecture, Enabling Technologies, Security and Privacy, and Applications (2017, neutral): “In IoT, the adversary can use a malicious node or device to transmit to the destination host with legitimate identiﬁcation information, which has been received by the destination host, in order to make the malicious node or device obtain the trust of IoT [89], [162].”
Physical Authentication of Control Systems: Designing Watermarked Control Inputs to Detect Counterfeit Sensor Outputs (2015, methodology): “The authors of [13, 14] create a physical authentication scheme, where a random “watermark” signal is added to the optimal control signal.”
Cyber security analysis of state estimators in electric power systems (2010, background): “Some of the literature has already tackled these problems such as false data injection in power system state estimation [6], security constrained control [7], and replay attacks [ 8 ].”
Control-Theoretic Methods for Cyberphysical Security: Geometric Principles for Optimal Cross-Layer Resilient Control Systems (2015, methodology): “116 IEEE CONTROL SYSTEMS MAGAZINE » FEBRUARY 2015 fuNdAMENTAL ATTACk dETECTION ANd IdENTIfICATION LIMITATIONS In this section, system- and graph-theoretic conditions for the detectability and identifiability of attacks are presented.”
Optimal Linear Cyber-Attack on Remote State Estimation (2017, background): “[15], [16] studied the feasibility of the replay attack on a control system equipped with a bad-data detector and proposed a countermeasure to detect the existence of such an attack.”
Detecting Integrity Attacks on SCADA Systems (2014, methodology): “), then it is proven by Mo and Sinopoli (2009) that if A is stable, the distribution of g k under replay attack will converge exponentially to the same distribution as g k without the attack.”
Networked control systems: a survey of trends and techniques (2020, background): “(2003) [17], Maroochy Shire Council’s sewage control system in Queensland, Australia (2000) [18], and Stuxnet worm which targeted many industrial control systems [19].”
Attack Detection and Identification in Cyber-Physical Systems (2013, background): “An active monitor injects an auxiliary input to reveal attacks [11].”
SWaT: a water treatment testbed for research and training on ICS security (2016, methodology): “However, many of the published algorithms are assessed for their effectiveness using simulation or numerically [2], [4], [6], [15], [16] This paper describes an operational ICS, the Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) testbed.”
Internet of things security: A top-down survey (2018, background): “In [91], the authors propose a solution to detect replay attacks in Cyber-Physical systems and propose countermeasures guaranteeing the detection of these attacks under some prede-ﬁned probability.”