Verifiable secret-ballot elections
By Josh Benaloh. 1987
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Dan Boneh
- Mihir Bellare
- Brent Waters
- Craig Gentry
- Yehuda Lindell
- Jens Groth
- Yuval Ishai
- David Pointcheval
Citations in the corpus
- A Review of Homomorphic Encryption Libraries for Secure Computation (2018, background): “Partially Homomorphic Encryption (PHE) schemes such as [9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19] allow only one type of operation any number of times - either addition or multiplication on encrypted data as compared to Somewhat Homomorphic schemes that support both.”
- A Survey on Homomorphic Encryption Schemes (2017, background): “PHE schemes are deployed in some applications like e-voting [Benaloh 1987] or Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky 1997].”
- Secure multiparty protocols and zero-knowledge proof systems tolerating a faulty minority (2004, background): “The principle behind adding secrets is simple (see [ 13 ]-[15]): if polynomials pxl(u) and px2(u) represent secrets xl and x2 (i.e., p~l(0)= Xl and p~2(0)= x2), then px,(U) + p~2(u) represents x 1 + x 2. Note that (Px~ + Px2)(O) = Xl + x2, the degree of(px~ + p~2)(u) is. t, and ifpx,(U) or p~(u) is ”
- The Economics of Personal Data and the Economics of Privacy (2010, background): “, 2004), or electronic voting (Benaloh, 1987); but it is also possible to have credential systems that provide authentication without identification (Camenisch and Lysyanskaya, 2001), share personal preferences while protecting privacy (Adar and Huberamn, 2001), leverage the power of recommender sys”
- Civitas: Toward a Secure Voting System (2008, methodology): “The Civitas security model comprises the environment in which Civitas is used, the security properties we require Civitas to satisfy, and the capabilities we ascribe to the adversary attempting to subvert those properties.”
- A Survey of Homomorphic Encryption for Nonspecialists (2007, background): “(ii) Benaloh [50] is a generalization of GM, that enables to manage inputs of (k) bits, k being a prime satisfying some particular constraints.”
- Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices (2009, background): “[8] J. Benaloh.”
- Practical multi-candidate election system (2001, methodology): “5.3 Receipt-Free and Incoercible Properties The concept of areceipt-freeness~ was first presented by Benaloh and Tuinstra [2].”
- Sharing Decryption in the Context of Voting or Lotteries (2000, background): “Most homomorphic cryptosystems as Goldwasser-Micali's 11], Benaloh's 1, 4], Naccache-Stern's 12], Okamoto-Uchiyama's 13] or Paillier's 14] cryptosystems need to distribute a secret value related to the factorization of an RSA modulus.”
- Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes (1999, methodology): “[3,16]), deciding n-th residuosity is believed to be computationally hard.”
- Evaluating 2-DNF Formulas on Ciphertexts (2005, methodology): “Such protocols were first considered by Benaloh and Fisher [9] [2] and more recently by Cramer et al. [10] [11].”
- A Simple Public-Key Cryptosystem with a Double Trapdoor Decryption Mechanism and Its Applications (2003, methodology): “To improve on bandwidth Benaloh and Fisher [1, 6] proposed a generalization of Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem based on the prime residuosity assumption.”
- Lecture Notes on Cryptography (2001, methodology): “[27] Josh Benaloh.”
- Two Party RSA Key Generation (1999, methodology): “Most of our requirements are met by the weaker assumption that deciding prime residuosity is intractable [2].”