A Framework for Studying Emotions Across Phylogeny
By David J. Anderson, Ralph Adolphs. 2014
560 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Since the 19th century, there has been disagreement over the fundamental question of whether “emotions” are cause or consequence of their associated behaviors. This question of causation is most directly addressable in genetically tractable model organisms, including invertebrates such as Drosophila. Yet there is ongoing debate about whether such species even have “emotions,” since emotions are typically defined with reference to human behavior and neuroanatomy. Here we argue that emotional behaviors are a class of behaviors that express internal emotion states. These emotion states exhibit certain general functional and adaptive properties that apply across any specific human emotions like fear or anger, as well as across phylogeny. These general properties, which can be thought of as “emotion primitives”, can be modeled and studied in evolutionarily distant model organisms, allowing functional dissection of their mechanistic bases, and tests of their causal relationships to behavior. More generally, our approach aims not only at better integration of such studies in model organisms with studies of emotion in humans, but also suggests a revision of how emotion should be operationalized within psychology and psychiatry.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Sensory Systems, Social Psychology
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Kent C. Berridge
- Morten L. Kringelbach
- Yoshinori Aso
- Gerald M. Rubin
- Pietro Perona
- Nobuhiro Yamagata
- Toshiharu Ichinose
- Guha Balakrishnan
In Sensory Systems
- Kent C. Berridge
- Morten L. Kringelbach
- T. Préat
- Yoshinori Aso
- P. Plaçais
- Gerald M. Rubin
- Pietro Perona
- Nobuhiro Yamagata
In Social Psychology
Citations in the corpus
- Mushroom body output neurons encode valence and guide memory-based action selection in Drosophila (2014, background): “It is upon these axes that primitive forms of emotion are thought to have evolved (Anderson and Adolphs, 2014).”
- Pleasure systems in the brain (2015, background): “Hedonic circuitry was therefore unlikely to have been shaped into its present form, or to have persisted throughout evolution, unless objective affective reactions actually conveyed significant consequences in terms of benefits for survival and fitness (Anderson and Adolphs, 2014; Damasio, 2010; Kri”
- An Appraisal-Driven Componential Approach to the Emotional Brain (2018, unknown): “…bi/tri-dimensional, and appraisal approaches— are progressively being considered within the scope of affective neuroscience (e.g., Adolphs, 2017; Anderson & Adolphs, 2014; Brosch & Sander, 2013; Grandjean, Sander, & Scherer, 2008; Hamann, 2012; Koelsch et al., 2015; Kragel & LaBar, 2016;…”
- Towards causal benchmarking of bias in face analysis algorithms (2020, background): “n when we talk about face attributes in the absence of a physical ground truth. Many attributes have both intrinsic and extrinsic manifestations. For example, “emotion” may be studied at three levels [4]: an unconscious physiological state, conscious self-perception (feelings), and emotional display”