Mean Field Games with a Dominating Player

By Alain Bensoussan, Michael Chau, Phillip S. C. Yam. 2014

95 citations recorded by the source corpus.

In this article, we consider mean field games between a dominating player and a group of representative agents, each of which acts similarly and also interacts with each other through a mean field term being substantially influenced by the dominating player. We first provide the general theory and discuss the necessary condition for the optimal controls and equilibrium condition by adopting adjoint equation approach. We then present a special case in the context of linear-quadratic framework, in which a necessary and sufficient condition can be asserted by stochastic maximum principle; we finally establish the sufficient condition that guarantees the unique existence of the equilibrium control. The proof of the convergence result of finite player game to mean field counterpart is provided in Appendix.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Modeling and Simulation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4d8217123ded2faa1bc70f0ac08793c61d462a75

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In Economics and Econometrics

  1. Pierre Cardaliaguet
  2. Xiuneng Zhu
  3. Alessio Porretta
  4. Marco Cirant
  5. René A. Carmona
  6. Daniel Lacker
  7. Markus Fischer
  8. François Delarue

In Finance

  1. Alessio Porretta
  2. Pierre Cardaliaguet
  3. Peiqi Wang
  4. Marco Cirant
  5. Xiuneng Zhu
  6. René A. Carmona
  7. Daniel Lacker
  8. Diogo A. Gomes

In Modeling and Simulation

  1. Peiqi Wang
  2. René A. Carmona
  3. Alessio Porretta
  4. Pierre Cardaliaguet
  5. Xiuneng Zhu

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