Towards an accurate AS-level traceroute tool

By Z. Morley Mao, Jennifer Rexford, Jia Wang, Randy Howard Katz. Conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication, 2003

390 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

The internet AS-level topology: three data sources and one definitive metric (2005, background): “, due to multi-origin ASes, that is, the same prefixes advertised by multiple ASes [17], AS-sets, and private ASes.”
A study of prefix hijacking and interception in the internet (2007, background): “[41] had to account for as part of their AS-level traceroute tool.”
The case for separating routing from routers (2004, background): “These “deflections” can also cause the AS-level forwarding path to differ from the BGP AS path, which can complicate debugging [30].”
A Survey of BGP Security Issues and Solutions (2010, background): “Being able to detect attacks before they occur is clearly the best alternative, and tools such as secure traceroute [121] and AS-level traceroute [122] to detect malicious routing may aid in this effort.”