Earnings Management and Capital Resource Allocation: Evidence from China's Accounting‐Based Regulation of Rights Issues

By Kevin C. W. Chen, Hongqi Yuan. 2004

595 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4b6c1ccd2c694717e7eec253a26d46fe4ced6f70

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Citations in the corpus

Government assisted earnings management in China (2008, background): “Prior literature has documented the rampant earnings management phenomenon in Chinese listed firms stimulated by CSRC’s regulations (Chen and Yuan, 2004; Haw et al., 2005).”
Accounting Fraud, Auditing and the Role of Government Sanctions in China (2015, unknown): “In China, revenue-related fraud is more consequential than assetrelated fraud because income performance is an important criterion for initial public offerings, rights offerings and maintaining exchangetrading status (Aharony, Lee, & Wong, 2000; Chen & Yuan, 2004).”
Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective ☆ (2007, background): “For example, Chen and Yuan (2004) present evidence that listed firms in China manage earnings for rights issues.”
Does the External Monitoring Effect of Financial Analysts Deter Corporate Fraud in China? (2014, background): “2000), rights issues (Chen and Yuan 2004), and delisting (Liu and Lu 2007) also establish accounting performance targets that increase the motives for firms to manage earnings.”
Corporate Governance Research on Listed Firms in China: Institutions, Governance and Accountability (2016, background): “Chen and Yuan [2004] find that from 1996 to1998, firms inflate non-operating earnings in order to qualify for the rights issue. Among the firms that are selected by the CSRC for rights issues, those that manage earnings do perform worse than firms that do not manage earnings. It shows that this admi”
Private vs State Ownership and Earnings Management: evidence from Chinese listed companies (2007, methodology): “Nevertheless, earnings management is found to be prevalent in Chinese listed com- 224 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE © 2007 The Authors Journal compilation © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007 Volume 15 Number 2 March 2007 panies (Aharony et al. , 2000; Liu and Lu, 2002; Chen and Yuan, 2004; Jian and Wong, 2004).”
Can Book-Tax Differences Capture Earnings Management and Tax Management? Empirical Evidence from China (2011, unknown): “The instruments of earnings management used in China include, but are not limited to, accruals (Lu, 1999), non-operating earnings or below-the-line items (Chen and Yuan, 2004; Haw et al., 2005), related party transactions (Jian and Wong, 2010, Lo et al.”
Do Individual Auditors Affect Audit Quality? Evidence from Archival Data (2012, background): “…items or non-core earnings as another proxy for earnings quality is motivated by previous studies that find that Chinese companies tend to inflate earnings by timing the execution of transactions pertaining to below-the-line items (Chen and Yuan 2004; Haw et al. 2005; Kao et al. 2009).”
On the Predictability of Chinese Stock Returns (2010, unknown): “For example, earnings management and accounting manipulation have been found to be prevalent (e.g., Chen and Yuan, 2004; Haw, Qi, Wu, and Wu, 2005; Jian and Wong, 2004); there is also evidence of rampant market manipulation (e.g., He, 1998; Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 2005).”