Strategic Protection Against Data Injection Attacks on Power Grids

By Tùng T. Kim, V. Poor. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2011

561 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Control and Systems Engineering, Electrical and Electronic Engineering

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/497703730ac5ef39d8d1bfca8fb4fad38b8168b9

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Computer Networks and Communications

In Control and Systems Engineering

In Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Citations in the corpus

A Review of False Data Injection Attacks Against Modern Power Systems (2017, background): “By synchronizing to GPS time, PMUs have the capability of providing accurate synchronous phasor measurements for geographically dispersed nodes in power grids [36].”
Detecting False Data Injection Attacks on Power Grid by Sparse Optimization (2014, methodology): “In [16], a low-complexity attacking strategy is designed to construct sparse false data injection attack vectors, and strategic protection schemes are also proposed based on greedy approaches.”
Smart attacks in smart grid communication networks (2012, background): “In addition, countermeasures are demonstrated in [6] with which it is possible to defend against malicious data injection if a small subset of measurements can be made immune to the data injection attacks.”
Cyber security in the Smart Grid: Survey and challenges (2013, background): “There are a line of continued works targeting constructing and counterattacking new classes of false data injection attacks [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] [57].”
Defending Against False Data Injection Attacks on Power System State Estimation (2017, methodology): “Kim and Poor [15] proposed a fast greedy algorithm to select a subset of meter measure-”
Vulnerability Assessment of AC State Estimation With Respect to False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks (2012, background): “SCADA RTUs forward sensor measurements from points of the transmission grid to a control center so that the state of the system, given by voltage magnitudes and angles at the buses of the system, can be estimated.”
A Survey of Physics-Based Attack Detection in Cyber-Physical Systems (2018, unknown): “Further work includes [10, 29, 46, 84, 90, 100, 108].”
Secure Control Systems: A Quantitative Risk Management Approach (2015, background): “minimum-Resource Attacks There is a significant amount of literature studying the stealthy attack (7) and its consequences to state-estimation data integrity (for example, [15] and [44]–[49]).”
False Data Injection on State Estimation in Power Systems—Attacks, Impacts, and Defense: A Survey (2017, background): “Kim and Poor [45] propose strategic countermeasures against FDI attacks on the power grid based on linearized measurement models.”