Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games

By H. Haller, Roger Lagunoff. 2000

53 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/494437b1d7cef7a1dc56738cc99f64148c40aff7

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Juan F. Escobar
2. Ulrich Doraszelski
3. Jan De Loecker

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Juan F. Escobar
2. Ulrich Doraszelski

Citations in the corpus

• A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification (2008, result): “(Harsanyi 1973a, van Damme 1991), we study the regularity of f by directly applying the transversality theorem—a generalization of Sard’s theorem—to it. As a corollary to our main genericity result, we deduce that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of Markov perfect equilibria ”