Game-Theoretical Models in Biology

By Mark Broom, Jan Rychtár. 2013

283 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Introduction The history of evolutionary games The key mathematical developments The range of applications Reading this book What Is a Game? Key game elements Games in biological settings Two Approaches to Game Analysis The dynamical approach The static approach-evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) Dynamics versus statics Some Classical Games The hawk-dove game The prisoner's dilemma The war of attrition The sex ratio game The Underlying Biology Darwin and natural selection Genetics Games involving genetics Fitness, strategies and players Selfish genes: how can non-beneficial genes propagate? The role of simple mathematical models Matrix Games Properties of ESSs ESSs in a 2 x 2 matrix game Haigh's procedure to locate all ESSs ESSs in a 3 x 3 matrix game Patterns of ESSs Extensions to the hawk-dove game Nonlinear Games Overview and general theory Linearity in the focal player strategy and playing the field Nonlinearity due to non-constant interaction rates Nonlinearity in the strategy of the focal player Some differences between linear and nonlinear theory Asymmetric Games Selten's theorem for games with two roles Bimatrix games Uncorrelated asymmetry-the owner-intruder game Correlated asymmetry Multi-Player Games Multi-player matrix games The multi-player war of attrition Structures of dependent pairwise games Extensive Form Games and Other Concepts in Game Theory Games in extensive form Perfect, imperfect and incomplete information Repeated games State-Based Games State-based games A question of size Life history theory Games in Finite and Structured Populations Finite populations and stochastic games Evolution on graphs Spatial games and cellular automata Adaptive Dynamics Introduction and philosophy Fitness functions and the fitness landscape Pairwise invasibility and evolutionarily singular strategies Adaptive dynamics with multiple traits The assumptions of adaptive dynamics The Evolution of Cooperation Kin selection and inclusive fitness Greenbeard genes Direct reciprocity: developments of the prisoner's dilemma Punishment Indirect reciprocity and reputation dynamics The evolution of cooperation on graphs Multi-level selection Group Living The costs and benefits of group living Dominance hierarchies: formation and maintenance The enemy without: responses to predators The enemy within: infanticide and other anti-social behavior Mating Games Introduction and overview Direct conflict Indirect conflict and sperm competition The battle of the sexes Selecting mates: signaling and the handicap principle Other signaling scenarios Food Competition Introduction Ideal free distribution for a single species Ideal free distribution for multiple species Distributions at and deviations from the ideal free distribution Compartmental models of kleptoparasitism Compartmental models of interference Producer-scrounger models Predator-Prey and Host-Parasite Interactions Game-theoretical predator-prey models The evolution of defense and signaling Brood parasitism Parasitic wasps and the asymmetric war of attrition Complex parasite lifecycles Epidemic Models SIS and SIR models The evolution of virulence Viruses and the prisoner's dilemma Conclusions Types of evolutionary games used in biology What makes a good mathematical model? Future developments Appendix: Intro to MATLAB Bibliography Index MATLAB, Further Reading, and Exercises appear at the end of each chapter.

Subfields: Sociology and Political Science

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Citations in the corpus

The replicator equation and other game dynamics (2014, background): “, π1ðx*; x*Þ= 0] is convergence stable (24) if it is asymptotically stable under [5].”
Maximizing diversity in biology and beyond (2015, unknown): “The question then becomes: if we start with a distribution p and have the resources to change it by only a given small amount, what should we do in order to maximize the diversity? Third, there are suggestive resemblances between the theory developed here and the theory of evolutionarily stable stra”
Games on graphs (2014, background): “Evolutionary game theory [54], [53], [17], [89], [118], [37], [38], [66], [12] is the study of evolution when selection depends on the relative abundance (D frequency) of strategies or phenotypes in the population.”
Evolutionary dynamics on any population structure (2016, background): “assical scenario for mathematical studies of evolution, is given by the complete graph. Of particular interest is the evolution of social behavior, which can be studied using evolutionary game theory [20, 21, 22]. Evolutionary game dynamics, which are tied to ecological dynamics [21], arise whenever”