Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes

By Timothy Hellwig, David J. Samuels. British Journal of Political Science, 2007

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The Incumbency Curse: Weak Parties, Term Limits, and Unfulfilled Accountability (2017, background): “…model stresses the importance of the variation in individual party strength for equilibrium electoral outcomes in the presence of term limits, and reinforces the distinction between the weakness of individual parties and the weakness of the party system as a whole introduced in previous sections.”
The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low‐Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems (2011, background): “Further, when governing coalitions are composed of fewer partners, it is easier for voters to attribute responsibility to parties for policy outcomes, so retrospective voting is more effective (Powell 2000: 47-68, Hellwig and Samuels 2007).”
Clarity of responsibility: How government cohesion conditions performance voting (2013, background): “…of strong committees and significant bicameralism, and subsequent work has extended this to include division of powers in presidential and semi-presidential systems (Samuels 2004; Hellwig & Samuels 2008) and in systems of multilevel governance (Arceneaux 2004; Cutler 2004, 2008; Anderson 2006).”