Small Firms, the Informal Sector, and the Devil's Deal
By J. Tendler. 2002
143 citations recorded by the source corpus.
These days, everybody loves small firms and their clusters–donors large and small, governments and nongovernment organizations, left and right. Some characterize small firms (SFs) as the proper subject of social policy and safety nets, and house SF programs in departments of social welfare or labor. Others see SFs as the stuff of “serious” economic development, and focus on upgrading their collective efficiency, productivity, and market access. Unfortunately, the combination of the social-policy view with the inevitable local politics of SFs generates a brew that inadvertently undermines not only the upgrading agenda, but certain aspects of the social-policy agenda itself–namely, better environmental, labor, and health-and-safety practices and protections. This article explains how this happens, and shows that things don’t always need to turn out that way, especially if donors and others pay attention to the histories lying behind today’s thriving SF clusters in developing countries.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/485514e2b9511978a31235f0bce4ea8cc7f1848d
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In Economics and Econometrics
Citations in the corpus
- Taxing the Informal Economy: The Current State of Knowledge and Agendas for Future Research (2014, methodology): “In what Tendler (2002) calls a ‘devil’s deal’, politicians make an unspoken agreement with informal sector operators: ‘if you vote for me […] I won’t collect taxes from you, I won’t make you comply with other tax, environmental or labour regulations and I will keep the police and inspectors from…”