Do Investors Care about the Auditor's Economic Dependence on the Client?*

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Understanding Earnings Quality: A Review of the Proxies, Their Determinants and Their Consequences (2010, background): “Auditor independence is associated with a lower implied cost of equity capital for the audit client (Khurana and Raman, 2006).”
Auditor Independence and Audit Quality (2015, background): “From the investors’ perspective, economic dependence on the client is viewed negatively, as reflected in cost of equity (Khurana & Raman, 2006) and the earnings response coefficient (Ghosh, Kallapur, & Moon, 2009).”
Do the Big 4 and the Second-tier firms provide audits of similar quality? (2010, methodology): “These control variables (BM through REC_RET) are based on prior research (e.g., Khurana and Raman 2004, 2006) and are defined in Table 1 panel C. Consistent with Fama and French (1997), we control for the book-to-market ratio (variable BM) as an equity risk factor.”
Does Auditor Tenure Improve Audit Quality? Moderating Effects of Industry Specialization and Fee Dependence (2009, unknown): “…(which contributes to total fee income of the public accounting firm) and audit quality has yielded mixed results, with some finding negative effects (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002; Khurana and Raman 2006) and others finding no effect (e.g., Ashbaugh, et al. 2003; Chung and Kallapur 2003; Li 2009).”