Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of Delegation

By K. McNamara. 2002

382 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/467b1e1afefc8adebe50f95a3e6af3cd54e603b3

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Finance

In Sociology and Political Science

Citations in the corpus

The (impossible) repo trinity: the political economy of repo markets (2016, background): “McNamara (2002) notes that independence became embedded in global norms of neoliberal governance as the most effective strategy for anchoring commitment to a low inflation target.”
Agency Escape: Decentralization or Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy? (2005, background): “In the hands of K. McNamara (2003) , this suggests relocating the decision to delegate in a wider political context and is critical of the supposedly apolitical nostrum of central bank independence.”
Credibility, Complexity and Uncertainty: Explaining the Institutional Independence of 29 EU Agencies (2010, background): “For instance, McNamara (2002) has demonstrated that the creation and diffusion of independent central banks around the globe has much less to do with functional needs than with a national and transnational culture of neoliberal economic policy, conceiving of price stability as an ‘absolute good’.”
The politics of policy diffusion (2019, background): “A certain institution, like central bank independence, or a specific policy, like inflation-targeting, may be considered as appropriate and legitimate, and therefore diffuse (McNamara, 2002).”
Making Rules for Global Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation at the Turn of the Millennium (2009, background): “…1989; Simmons 2001; Abdelal 2007; and Singer 2007+ 72+ Examples of constructivist arguments include Sinclair 2005; Jabko 2006; and Abdelal 2007+ 73+ McNamara 2002 and 1998+ On the difference between norm-governed and norm-transforming change with respect to international regimes, see Ruggie…”
The Myth of Market Neutrality: A Comparative Study of the European Central Bank’s and the Swiss National Bank’s Corporate Security Purchases (2019, background): “The past decades saw central banks acquire considerable independence from democratic institutions (McNamara 2002, Singleton 2010).”
Black Swans, Lame Ducks, and the mystery of IPE's missing macroeconomy (2017, background): “The third major institutional change was the rise of independent central banks and the shift to monetary policy dominance (Johnson, 2016; McNamara, 2002).”
Learning From Others (2009, background): “Independent central banks are a case in point: their spread has been due to their symbolic properties more than to their consequences for macroeconomic outcomes (McNamara 2002; Polillo and Guillén 2005).”