Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note

By Judith S. Goldstein, Lisa L. Martin. International Organization, 2000

372 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/467a8e2cdc234ba92d06df525bfcf895a2cd4fe5

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Citations in the corpus

Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism (2005, background): “…international and domestic factors+ See Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993; Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff 1998; Weiss and Jacobson 1998; and Underdal and Hanf 2000+ 67+ Simmons 2000+ 68+ Sikkink 1993+ 69+ Goldstein and Martin 2000+ The first-order condition is given by ( i51 2 2 2ai ~x 2 xi !”
Principal–agent theory and the World Trade Organization: Complex agency and ‘missing delegation’ (2011, background): “It is argued that legalization empowers protectionist forces and takes away decision-makers’ appetite for engaging in negotiations with a view of liberalizing markets (Goldstein and Martin, 2000).”
Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime (2008, background): “…19+1 percentage points higher upon accession, and would have maintained applied tariffs up to 30 percent higher than otherwise+ How much addi- 65+ Goldstein and Martin 2000+ 66+ Shaffer 2003+ 67+ See Bagwell and Staiger 2006; and Gowa and Kim 2005+ 68+ For example, Trebilock and Howse 1999,…”
Access to Protection: Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy in Democracies (2007, background): “…may have little incentive to lobby against protection ex ante because the chance that retaliatory tariffs will target their industry is small+ Goldstein and Martin 2000 argue that the WTO should make it easier for exporters to mobilize to maintain existing trade agreements as the WTO…”
Governance without a state: Can it work? (2010, background): “…is all the more likely the better the norms and rules are defined (precision), the higher the degree of obligation, and the more adjudication of compliance is referred to independent monitoring or even judicial systems (delegation) (Abbott et al. 2000; Goldstein & Martin 2000; Zangl & Zürn 2004).”