Oil and democracy: More than a cross-country correlation?

By S. Aslaksen. 2010

228 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4599abfa9e9ec2df6e55745b0a1d53b8185255f8

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Does Oil Wealth Affect Democracy in Africa (2014, background): “Thus, empirical results that support the “oil-hurts-democracy” thesis include Barro (1999), Ross (2001), Jensen and Wantchekon (2004), Smith (2004), Tsui (2011) and Aslaksen (2010).”
The ICTD Government Revenue Dataset (2014, unknown): “However, owing at least in part to the weakness of cross-country revenue data, most existing studies have relied instead on more readily measures of the value of resource production to test the relationship (e.g. Ross 2001; Aslaksen 2010; Haber and Menaldo 2011).”
Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse (2011, methodology): “First, it has emerged as the standard measure in recent work on the resource curse (e.g., Aslaksen 2010; Dunning 2008; Ramsay n.d.; and Ross 2009).”
Oil and political survival (2013, unknown): “[4] Aslaksen, S.”
Why do some resource-abundant countries succeed while others do not? (2009, background): “Aslaksen (2006) shows that the well established correlation between resource abundance and corruption survives also when using panel data with country fixed effects, while Aslaksen (2007) shows that the tendency for oil to impede democracy is also valid in a similar approach.”
The resource curse revisited: governance and natural resources (2011, result): “Barro (1999), Aslaksen (2010), and Tsui (2011) support these results, even though they use different measures, samples, and/or econometric techniques. In a study using a longer time series and more countries, Ross (2009) finds that oil wealth strongly inhibits democratic transitions in authoritarian”
The role of country-level institutional factors in escaping the natural resource curse: Insights from Ghana (2019, background): “Prior research suggests that any development-oriented initiative that does not include and drive democratic policies to bring sustainable change, might fail to achieve political stability, growth and development (Aslaksen, 2010; Barro, 1999; Block, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2009; Lehman and Thorne”
The Quality of Political Institutions and the Curse of Natural Resources (2011, unknown): “Aslaksen (2009) shows that levels of oil systematically predict both levels and changes in democracy in a sample of up to 156 countries between 1972 and 2002.”
The extractive industries and development: The resource curse at the micro, meso and macro levels (2015, background): “Cross-country statistical analysis has verified the link between mineral resources and limited government democratic accountability (Andersen and Ross, 2014; Aslaksen, 2010; Ross, 2001; Tsui, 2011).”
The Big Oil Change (2014, result): “Why do these findings differ so much from other recent studies, which conclude that there is a resource curse (Andersen & Aslaksen, 2013; Aslaksen, 2010; Cuaresma, Oberhofer, & Raschky, 2010; Fayad, Bates, & Hoeffler, 2011; Ramsay, 2011; Ross, 2012; Tsui, 2010)?”
The Politics of the Resource Curse: A Review (2020, methodology): “…wealth is associated with less democracy has been replicated many times, using better data and increasingly methods; recent studies report it is robust to the use of country fixed effects (Aslaksen, 2010; Tsui, 2011; Andersen and Ross, 2014) and instrumental variables (Ramsay, 2011; Tsui, 2011).”