Signaling Character in Electoral Competition
By Navin Kartik, And R Preston Mcafee, Mcafee, Divi, Nageeb Ali, Ethan BUENO DE MESQUITA, Steven Callander, Arnaud Costinot, Vincent Crawford, Dino Gerardi and 3 more. 2007
264 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/451ddef07433ab9797c94dffd6c2e48761c13d8e
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Management Science and Operations Research
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Citations in the corpus
- The Politics of Attention (2018, unknown): “We examine how deteriorations of news quality affect equilibrium attention allocations and policies, a concern that has become more relevant recently due to the rise of partisan media and fake news (Levendusky (2013); Barthel et al.”
- A Political Theory of Populism (2013, unknown): “The politician in power at time t = 1 and the elite bargain over x1 (if the politician is dishonest), and the politician chooses policy x1 ∈ R. 2.”
- How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign (2013, background): “More recently, Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009), Kartik and McAfee (2007), and Bernhardt, Camara, and Squintani (2011) provide interesting theoretical studies of strategic electoral competition with candidates differentiated along both (ideological) policy platform and valence dimensions.”