A Polynomial-time Nash Equilibrium Algorithm for Repeated Stochastic Games

By Enrique Munoz de Cote, Michael L. Littman. 2008

36 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by buttressing mutually beneficial behavior with threats, where possible. One component of our algorithm efficiently searches for an approximation of the egalitarian point, the fairest pareto-efficient solution. The paper concludes by applying the algorithm to a set of grid games to illustrate typical solutions the algorithm finds. These solutions compare very favorably to those found by competing algorithms, resulting in strategies with higher social welfare, as well as guaranteed computational efficiency.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

  1. Enrique Munoz de Cote
  2. Pablo Hernandez-Leal
  3. Michael L. Littman
  4. Jakob N. Foerster
  5. Michael Kaisers
  6. Pieter Abbeel
  7. Tim Baarslag
  8. Josh Tenenbaum

In Management Science and Operations Research

  1. Shimon Whiteson
  2. Pieter Abbeel
  3. Pablo Hernandez-Leal
  4. Josh Tenenbaum
  5. Igor Mordatch
  6. Jakob N. Foerster
  7. Enrique Munoz de Cote
  8. Michael L. Littman

Citations in the corpus