Fragmented fiscal policy

By Roberto Perotti, Yianos Kontopoulos. 2002

491 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/44b01db7328b4b1e501dca0a090cfbfcd4ef7b0f

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence (2001, methodology): “However, subsequent research found less support for the Roubini-Sachs view.1 Recently, Kontopoulos and Perotti have broadened this approach by arguing that the previous literature overlooked what they call size fragmentation (see Kontopoulos & Perotti (1999) and Perotti & Kontopoulos (1999)).”
The perfect finance minister: Whom to appoint as finance minister to balance the budget? (2014, unknown): “12For example, the case of coalition governments is considered by Haan, Sturm, and Beekhuis (1999), the case of large cabinets by Woo (2003) and Wehner (2010) while Volkerink and Haan (2001), Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) and Schaltegger and Feld (2009) cover both aspects.”
Flexible Fiscal Rules and Countercyclical Fiscal Policy (2016, background): “…found fiscal rules to be discipline-enhancing (Alesina and Bayoumi, 1996; Bohn and Inman, 1996; Brzozowski and Gorzelak, 2010; Debrun and others, 2008; Fatas and Mihov, 2006; de Haan and others, 1999; Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1997; Manasse, 2006; Perotti and Kontopoulos, 2002; and Tapsoba, 2012).”
Partisan Politics: The Empirical Evidence from OECD Panel Studies (2017, unknown): “Government ideology is measured by the indices of Potrafke (2009a) and Bjørnskov (2008).”
Do political variables affect fiscal policy adjustment decisions? New empirical evidence (2007, background): “Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) were among the first to argue that the so-called size fractionalization of government—measured by the (effective) number of political parties or the number of spending ministers in government—affects fiscal policy outcomes.”
Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline? (2006, background): “Alesina and Perotti (1999), Stein, Talvi, and Grisanti (1999), Knight and Levinson (2000), and Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002) discuss the difficulties in dealing with this problem of reverse causality.”
Government Weakness and Local Public Debt Development in Flemish Municipalities (2005, background): “Analysing not only the deficit, but also its constituent parts: expenditures and revenues, Kontopoulos and Perotti (1998, 1999) find that fragmentation increases the deficit and that this effect is mostly due to the effect of fragmentation on expenditures.4 On the other hand, Hahm, Kamlet and Mowe”
Does the Size of the Legislature Affect the Size of Government? Evidence from Two Natural Experiments (2012, unknown): “While the empirical results from the research program of comparative political economy are very interesting, it faces very challenging identification problems as discussed by Persson and Tabellini (2003), and Acemoglu (2005).”