The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study
By Sendhil Mullainathan, Markus Noeth, Antoinette Schoar. 2012
394 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/44542c60ceed6b5c27e58617f2d7e2ef827efd1a
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- M. Kramer
- Oscar Stolper
- A. Walter
- Anna Lusardi
- Rob J M Alessie
- Tabea Bucher-Koenen
- M.C.J. van Rooij
- Olivia S. Mitchell
In Economics and Econometrics
- M. Kramer
- Oscar Stolper
- A. Walter
- Anna Lusardi
- Rob J M Alessie
- Tabea Bucher-Koenen
- M.C.J. van Rooij
- Paul Heidhues
In Finance
- M.C.J. van Rooij
- Rob J M Alessie
- Oscar Stolper
- A. Walter
- Tabea Bucher-Koenen
- Anna Lusardi
- Thomas Philippon
- Takeshi Murooka
Citations in the corpus
- How Financially Literate Are Women? An Overview and New Insights (2017, background): “In an audit study of financial advice, Mullainathan, Nöth, and Schoar (2012) found that young female investors received lower quality advice than young male investors.”
- Inferior Products and Profitable Deception (2017, result): “Exactly in line with this prediction, Mullainathan et al. (2011) document that firms tend to push expensive active funds through intermediaries.”
- Financial Literacy and the Demand for Financial Advice (2015, neutral): “Not only advisors/brokers do not appear to fully correct investors’ behavioral biases (Shapira and Venezia, 2001; Mullainathan et al., 2010), but it is evident that conflicts of interest may affect the supply of financial advice.”
- Financial Literacy, Confidence and Financial Advice Seeking (2016, result): “Some studies have indeed established hat advisors do more harm than good (Mullainathan et al., 2012; Hackethal et al., 2012), whereas other research has found ositive effects (Kramer, 2012; Hung and Yoong, 2010).”
- Financial literacy, financial advice, and financial behavior (2017, background): “2012; Hung and Yoong 2010), a typical advisor’s incentive structure does in fact create a conflict of interest, leading advisors to reinforce biases of their clients instead of correcting them (Mullainathan et al. 2012) and tilt their recommendations towards costly transactions (Hoechle et al.”
- FINANCIAL LITERACY, FINANCIAL EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC OUTCOMES (2012, neutral): “Mullainathan et al. (2012) conduct an audit study of financial advisors in Boston, sending them scripted investors who present needs that are either in line or at odds with the financial advisor’s personal interests.”