Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience

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Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches (2011, background): “Sometimes proponents of mechanistic explanation even vaguely hint or assume that functional analysis is the same as mechanistic explanation (e.g., Bechtel 2008, 140; Feest 2003; Glennan 2005), but they don't articulate and defend that thesis.”
The Nature of Dynamical Explanation* (2011, background): “Indeed, after having been discovered, behavioral regularities are typically explained by describing the mechanisms responsible therefore (Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Craver 2007; Wright and Bechtel 2007).”
Functional explaining: a new approach to the philosophy of explanation (2014, background): “…the benefits of diagramatic reasoning to understanding in mathematics (see the discussion in Avigad 2010, Section 3.5) and cognitive science (Bechtel 2008, pp. 19–20) 31 It is possible this problem of strange beliefs leading to odd explanations could be patched by simply adding to…”
Autonomy and Enactivism: Towards a Theory of Sensorimotor Autonomous Agency (2017, background): “And this is what theories of autonomy, in a variety of flavours (Barandiaran 2004; Barandiaran and Ruiz-Mirazo 2008; Bechtel 2007a; Christensen and Hooker 2000; Di Paolo 2004; Moreno et al. 2008; Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno 2004, 2011; Smithers 1997; Varela 1979) originally came to contribute: a theory…”