Competition for Viewers and Advertisers in a TV Oligopoly
By Hans Jarle Kind, Tore Nilssen, Lars Sørgard. Social Science Research Network, 2007
135 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Abstract This study considers a model of a TV oligopoly where TV channels transmit advertising and viewers dislike such commercials. It is shown that advertisers make a lower profit the larger the number of TV channels. If TV channels are sufficiently close substitutes, there will be underprovision of advertising relative to social optimum. This study also finds that the more viewers dislike ads, the more likely it is that welfare is increasing in the number of advertising-financed TV channels. A publicly owned TV channel can partly correct market distortions, in some cases, by having a larger amount of advertising than private TV channels. It may even have advertising in cases where advertising is wasteful per se.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/42348c2f252b5a4c1b06e53485d88b37e4114598
How researchers see this paper
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Torben Stühmeier
- Tobias Wenzel
- Justus Haucap
- Ulrich Heimeshoff
- Hanna Hottenrott
- Jens Suedekum
- Ralf Dewenter
In Marketing
- Torben Stühmeier
- Tobias Wenzel
- Justus Haucap
- Ulrich Heimeshoff
- Hanna Hottenrott
- Ralf Dewenter
- Jens Suedekum
In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- Regulating Advertising in the Presence of Public Service Broadcasting (2012, background): “The impact of competition in the advertising market has been analyzed in recent papers by Kind et al. (2007), Godes et al. (2009), and Dewenter et al. (2011).”