Aggregate Consequences of Limited Contract Enforceability

By Thomas F. Cooley, Ramon Marimon, Vincenzo Quadrini. Journal of Political Economy, 2004

416 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4229565ce79f73dc8f3ea625102c6da568312cd8

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Citations in the corpus

Financial (In)Stability, Supervision and Liquidity Injections: A Dynamic General Equilibrium Approach (2008, positive): “Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG hereafter) or Cooley et al. (2004) adopt this approach in a dynamic general equilibrium model and assess the quantitative implications of credit frictions for the real economy.”
Credit Risk and Disaster Risk (2013, neutral): “and the economys steady-state capital-labor ratio k=N and leverage L = B=K are determined by the two equations: e ((1 ) 1) 1 p+ p(1 btfp) ) 1 1 + k N 1! (18)”
Collateral and Capital Structure (2009, background): “…extent that low net worth firms have high leverage and a high probability of bankruptcy, this implies a negative relation between net worth 1 The aggregate implications of firm financing with limited enforcement are studied by Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004) and Jermann and Quadrini (2007).”
Credit Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations in an Economy with Production Heterogeneity (2011, background): “Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini ð2004Þ study constrainedoptimal dynamic contracts under limited enforceability.”
Estate Taxation, Entrepreneurship, and Wealth (2009, neutral): “As in Marcet and Marimon [32], Kehoe and Levine [26], Albuquerque and Hopenhayn[3], Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini [15], and Cagetti and De Nardi [11], the borrowing constraints are endogenously determined in equilibrium and”
Credit Cycles Redux (2004, neutral): “9 In what follows, we assume that condition (8) holds and study its implications around the steady state on the models parameters.”
Evaluation of financial liberalization : a general equilibrium model with constrained occupation choice (2004, background): “An equilibrium at any date t given the beginning-of-period wealth distribution Gt(b) is a wage wt, such that given wt, every agent with wealth-cost pair (b, x) chooses occupation and savings to maximize (4) and (5), respectively, and the wage wt clears the labor market in the sense that the number o”
Inspecting the Mechanism: Leverage and the Great Recession in the Eurozone (2017, background): “This is complicated because private deleveraging can happen even without sudden stop and because we are not willing to impose the same restrictions regarding functional forms and anticipations on private agents as we impose on governments.”
Credit Risk and the Macroeconomy: Evidence from an Estimated DSGE Model (2009, background): “However, as pointed out by Crosbie and Bohn [2003] and Vassalou and Xing [2004], the excessive volatility of market leverage (V/E) in equation 4 causes large swings in the estimated volatility of the firm’s value σV , which are difficult to reconcile with the observed frequency of defaults and movem”
The Magnitude and Cyclical Behavior of Financial Market Frictions (2004, methodology): “We used the method proposed by Cooper and Davydenko (2002) to estimate the distortionary effect of the state-level taxation on corporate bond spreads. According to Elton et al. (2001), the relevant tax rate for the tax-adjusted spread between corporate and government securities is given by τ = ts(1 ”
Financial Intermediation and Economic Development: A Quantitative Assessment ⁄ (2007, neutral): “A multi-period version of this problem would greatly complicate computations, unless one resorts to the strong simplifying assumption that preferences are linear, as in, among many other papers, Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004).”
Sovereign default and debt renegotiation (2010, background): “the optimal contracting literature, such as Phelan (1995); Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2004) ; and Krueger and Uhlig (2006).6 These papers assume a complete set of contingent”
Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics (2003, neutral): “Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2001), Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2001) and Quintin (2001) study related cash diversion models but assume that the firm's cash flow is publicly observed.”