Economic geography and the fiscal effects of regional integration

By Rodney D. Ludema, I. Wooton. 2000

305 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/420d79bcae795f9f0b085aff29ac3acc14b7f78f

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Citations in the corpus

Agglomeration and Tax Competition (2006, methodology): “3See Ludema and Wooton (2000), Kind et al. (2000), Andersson and Forslid (2003), Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Baldwin et al. (2003). equilibria are either those where industry is divided symmetrically or where all of industry locates in one of two countries.”
Tax and Public Input Competition (2007, unknown): “…a low level of capital per head, natural advantages of the country (e.g. vineyards in Burgundy or Venetia) or for reasons exhibited by economic geography such as economies of agglomeration and market potential (Ludema and Wooton, 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005).”
Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonization (2001, unknown): “Result 1 (trade costs matter): The equilibrium gap between the big and the small nations’ tax rates depends upon the integration of goods markets as well as the mobility of capital ( Ludema and Wooton,2000 ).”
How Does FDI React to Corporate Taxation? (2005, background): “Second, location decisions depend on the combination of taxation and public goods provision available in host countries (Tiebout, 1956), which can soften the link between the tax level and the amount of FDI located in a country.”
Agglomeration and economic geography (2003, unknown): “The symmetric equilibrium is stable as long as the two eigenvalues of the Jacobian of (46) are negative at nA = nB = n∗.”
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT CORPORATE TAX COMPETITION? (2013, background): “9 See Martinez-Mongay (2000) for a comprehensive discussion of the implicit tax rates and a slightly different measure of implicit tax rates. Further, Volkerink et al (2002) show that some of tax ratios of Mendoza et al.”
Subsidies to Poor Regions and Inequalities: Some Unpleasant Arithmetic (2006, methodology): “We will analyze the effect of regional subsidies in the “footloose capital” model developed by Martin and Rogers (1995) and further analyzed in Baldwin et al.”
The structure of simple 'New Economic Geography' models (or, On identical twins) (2005, background): “6 See e.g., Andersson and Forslid (2003), Baldwin et al. (2003a), Kind et al. (2000), and Ludema and Wooton (2000).”
Do Governments Tax Agglomeration Rents? (2013, background): “…of capital and allow agglomeration-hosting governments to set a high corporate tax rate without triggering an immediate capital outﬂow even if capital is in principle highly mobile (see Ludema and Wooton (2000), Andersson and Forslid (2003), Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Borck and Pﬂ¨uger (2006)).”