Because Without Cause
By Marc Lange. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2016
265 citations recorded by the source corpus.
This chapter investigates non-causal scientific explanations that work by describing how the explanandum involves stronger-than-physical necessity by virtue of certain facts (“constraints”) that possess some variety of necessity stronger than ordinary causal laws possess. In particular, the chapter offers an account of the order of explanatory priority in explanations by constraint. It examines several important examples of explanations by constraint, distinguishing their natural kinds. It gives an account of the sense in which constraints are modally stronger than ordinary causal laws and an account of why certain deductions of constraints exclusively from other constraints possess explanatory power whereas others lack explanatory power.
Subfields: History and Philosophy of Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/414c7c57f4712f2f9c4903fd14da63d8ff8fb82e
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In History and Philosophy of Science
Citations in the corpus
- Reasons, Values, Stakeholders: A Philosophical Framework for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021, background): “…some philosophers have argued that mathematical facts explain a variety of empirical phenomenon better than causal information does, across a range of sciences, from condensed matter physics to evolutionary and developmental biology or computational neuroscience [54, 55, 56, 61, 58, 57, 60].”