When Does Institutional Investor Activism Increase Shareholder Value?: The Carbon Disclosure Project
By Eun-Hee Kim, Thomas P. Lyon. 2011
138 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/413c9913b4579ceb01a9f83cf495ad8e98bf1a65
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- D. Broadstock
- P. Romilly
- A. Collins
- Omaima A. G. Hassan
- Konstantinos Vergos
- L. Hunt
- Su‐Yol Lee
- Massimo Filippini
In Finance
In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- Determinants of Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Emission Disclosure: An Empirical Investigation on Turkish Firms (2018, background): “Kim and Lyon [83] demonstrate that institutional investors’ consciousness towards climate change can increase shareholder value and awareness of management.”
- Market Responses to Firms' Voluntary Climate Change Information Disclosure and Carbon Communication (2015, background): “Although there have been a number of studies examining the relationships between green information, environment-related liabilities, and shareholder value, very few studies have considered the relationship between climate change and firm value (Kim and Lyon, 2011; Matsumura et al., 2011; Griffin and”
- Voluntary disclosure, greenhouse gas emissions and business performance: assessing the first decade of reporting (2017, background): “Indeed in some other theoretical studies voluntary over-compliance has simply been conceptualized as exercises in ‘greenwash’ i.e. simply augmenting marketing spend (see, for example, Kim and Lyon 2011, Mahoney et al. 2013).”
- Relations between corporate economic performance, environmental disclosure and greenhouse gas emissions: new insights. (2018, methodology): “…effect of climate change through changes in weather patterns, rising sea levels and dangerous changes in patterns of drought and flooding, and the indirect effect via regulatory intervention including abatement and liability costs arising from taxes and trading schemes (Kim and Lyon, 2011, p. 2).”