A cross-national analysis of economic voting: taking account of the political context across time and nations

By R. Nadeau, R. Niemi, Antoine Yoshinaka. 2002

223 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Political Science and International Relations, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/412a1f203cc05046e4dac93279b840612cff7578

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Citations in the corpus

Yardstick competition and the political costs of raising taxes: An empirical analysis of Spanish municipalities (2007, unknown): “After all, many papers analysing economic voting in an international context rejected it, at least in its basic version (see for example Anderson, 2000, Nadeau et al ., 2002).”
Determinants of tax innovation: The case of environmental taxes in Flemish municipalities (2006, background): “In other words, fragmented governments may be less hesitant to introduce new taxes as each member of the coalition can dblameT the other coalition partners for the introduction (see also Anderson, 2000 and Nadeau et al., 2002).”
Conditional Punishment: A Comparative Analysis of the Electoral Consequences of Welfare State Retrenchment in OECD Nations, 1980–2003 (2008, methodology): “Another set of variables concerns the state of the economy, such as economic growth and unemployment, as voters are assumed to blame governing parties for poor economic performance (Anderson 2000; LewisBeck and Paldam 2000; Nadeau et al. 2002; Nannestad and Paldam 1994).”
Clarity of responsibility: How government cohesion conditions performance voting (2013, methodology): “…including the proportion of seats held by the largest party (Anderson 2000; Nadeau et al. 2002); ideological cohesion of the governing coalition (Nadeau et al. 2002); longevity of the government (Nadeau et al. 2002; Bengtsson 2004); party system fraction- HOW GOVERNMENT COHESION CONDITIONS…”
Performance pressure: Patterns of partisanship and the economic vote (2011, background): “All of these variables are important determinants of how readily voters can identify parties that can be held accountable for economic outcomes (Powell & Whitten 1993; Whitten & Palmer 1999; Nadeau et al 2002; Duch & Stevenson 2008).”
The VP-function revisited: a survey of the literature on vote and popularity functions after over 40 years (2013, background): “Table 2 Nannestad and Paldam (1994) conclusions on VP-functions, with an assessment of their current standing∗”