Stubborn Mining: Generalizing Selfish Mining and Combining with an Eclipse Attack

By Kartik Nayak, Srijan Kumar, Andrew K. Miller, Elaine Shi. European Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2016

532 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Information Systems, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/40406aeaacc4a460ced249862147655b66ee00d2

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Citations in the corpus

SoK: Consensus in the Age of Blockchains (2017, background): “Broadly, incentivization in PoW blockchains has seen some study [86]: major limitations have been identified [41, 61, 106, 119], and possible solutions have been proposed [138].”
From blockchain consensus back to Byzantine consensus (2017, background): “It is well known that delaying network messages can impact Bitcoin [17, 38, 42, 24, 37].”
On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward (2016, background): “In order to maintain our focus on the diﬀerence between transaction fees and ﬁxed block-rewards, we consider just “vanilla” selﬁsh mining, although it is an interesting consideration for future work to consider selﬁsh miners who also undercut, or various other generalizations (e.g. [7, 20, 23]).”
REM: Resource-Efficient Mining for Blockchains (2017, background): “Despite their imperfections [26, 35, 37, 65, 71], blockchains [38, 64, 67] have attracted the interest of the ﬁnancial and technology industries [16, 25, 34, 47, 69, 74] as a way to build a transaction systems with distributed trust.”
Hijacking Bitcoin: Routing Attacks on Cryptocurrencies (2016, methodology): “We also quantify their effectiveness on the current Bitcoin topology using data collected from a Bitcoin supernode combined with BGP routing data.”
Decentralization in Bitcoin and Ethereum Networks (2018, result): “Similar to other works in the literature [58, 68], we assume that miners accurately self-identify themselves.”
FruitChains: A Fair Blockchain (2017, background): “Nakamoto’s blockchain suffers from a so-called selfish-mining attack, where even a minority coalition that controls network delivery can manage to reap close to twice its fair share of block rewards [4, 7, 15, 17, 21] — in particular, if the adversary wields close to a half of the computational powe”
Enhancing Bitcoin Security and Performance with Strong Consistency via Collective Signing (2016, background): “Later work revealed additional vulnerabilities to transaction reversibility, double-spending, and strategic mining attacks [25, 31, 34, 35, 48, 3].”
A Survey on Security and Privacy Issues of Bitcoin (2017, background): “In this [132], eclipse and delivery-tampering and double-spending attacks vulnerable to slow down or temporary DoS attack and 51% attack, way, CoinJoin makes the multiple inputs of a transaction independent from each other, thus it breaks the basic heuristic from Section V-A (i.e., inputs of a…”
An Overview of Blockchain Technology: Architecture, Consensus, and Future Trends (2017, background): “In stubborn mining [48], miners could amplify its gain by non-trivially composing mining attacks with network-level eclipse attacks.”
A Survey of Blockchain From the Perspectives of Applications, Challenges, and Opportunities (2019, background): “, proposed a stubborn mining strategy that can result in 13% gains in comparison with selfish mining [109].”
Blockchain challenges and opportunities: a survey (2018, background): “In stubborn mining [61], miners can amplify its gain by non-trivially composing mining attacks with network-level eclipse attacks.”
Blockchain Disruption and Smart Contracts (2018, unknown): “Consequently, our model would not apply to a subset of permissioned or private blockchains that generate consensus @ c h i c 7 Eyal and Sirer (2014) and Nayak et al. (2016) study ag “selﬁsh mining” and the related “stubborn mining” in whichminerslaunchblock-withholdingattacks.”
A Survey on Consensus Mechanisms and Mining Strategy Management in Blockchain Networks (2018, methodology): “Black and brown transitions denote Trail-stubborn mining (adapted from [129]).”