Can Enforcement Backfire? Crime Displacement in the Context of Customs Reform in the Philippines

By Dean Yang. Review of Economics and Statistics, 2008

154 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/40183c63706193457ff6b351f4e6aae7501c60a2

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Citations in the corpus

Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement (2017, unknown): “These findings are complementary with Yang (2008), who shows that increased enforcement on one method of customs duty avoidance in the Philippines prompts importers to shift to an alternative duty-avoidance method.”
Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion Program (2016, unknown): “…Pomeranz, and Singhal (2012)), targeted auditing strategies (Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez (2012); Aparicio (2012)) and third-party monitoring of customs duty collection (Yang (2008a, 2008b)).3 Second, this paper is related to the political agency literature (Barro (1973); Ferejohn (1986)).”
DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT A: ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY (2012, background): “The empirical work by Yang (2008) on customs enforcement in the Philippines finds that selective increases in enforcement may have been fully offset by displacement.”
Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan† (2015, background): “Our project also draws direct inspiration from work in development economics on efforts to improve transparency and accountability ( Niehaus et al. 2013; Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan 2012; Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2003; Ferraz and Finan 2008; Olken 2007; Yang 2008 .”
Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia (2005, background): “These roads range in length from 0.5 to 3 kilometers and may either run within the village or run from the village to the fields.”