Central Bank Transparency: Where, Why, and with What Effects?
By N. Dinçer, Barry Eichengreen. 2007
209 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3fd80e5bacc92b6be66b5f2decd0d1c49fd3bb4d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- C. Walsh
- G. Hammond
- N. Dinçer
- Barry Eichengreen
- Carlos Thomas
- Jongrim Ha
- P. Agénor
- Jeffrey A. Frankel
In Finance
- C. Walsh
- G. Hammond
- N. Dinçer
- Barry Eichengreen
- Jongrim Ha
- Jeffrey A. Frankel
- P. Agénor
- Geert Bekaert
Citations in the corpus
- Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures (2013, background): “Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) distinguish more aspects of transparency and consider more than one point in time.”
- Inflation Targeting: What Have We Learned? (2009, background): “Circles, inflation targeters; triangles, non-inflation targeters Source: Dincer and Eichengreen (2007). r 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd is the reasoning behind much of the opposition to formal inflation targeting in the United States, where inflation targeting is viewed as inconsistent with the…”
- Optimal Central Bank Transparency (2008, unknown): “DoC ¼ degree of competition, INST ¼ quality of public and private institutions, p ¼ in fl ation, T ¼ transparency index (Dincer and Eichengreen, 2007), WF ¼ wage fl exibility, CR ¼ customer relations, and DW ¼ Durbin – Watson statistic.”
- Trends in Monetary Policy Transparency (2009, unknown): “Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) exploit their panel data set and find that transparency has a significant negative effect on the variability of inflation and output, controlling for macroeconomic features (including openness, financial depth and past inflation) and using instrumental variables (in…”
- State of the art of inflation targeting (2012, background): “Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) find that in their sample of 100 central banks the most transparent were the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the Swedish Riksbank, the Bank of England, the Czech National Bank, the Bank of Canada, the ECB, and the Central Bank of the Philippines.”