Political business cycles at the municipal level

By Linda Veiga, Francisco Veiga. 2004

494 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3f2bf35d2a0708f4753bf86f7e6f0992e4a9ab6e

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Citations in the corpus

Yardstick competition in a Federation: Theory and Evidence from China (2012, background): “…all public spending generated by omitted common shocks.37 Following Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008), Foucault, Madies, and Paty (2008), Veiga and Veiga (2007) and Redoano (2007), we introduce the lagged dependent variable, Eit 1 , as a right hand side in order to take into account the…”
Election results and opportunistic policies: A new test of the rational political business cycle model (2011, methodology): “ Veiga and Veiga (2007) find evidence of opportunism in the year prior to election for some expenditure items, but the opportunistic distortion is always higher in the election year.”
Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence (2013, unknown): “To what extent does the electorate learn, thereby making election-induced fiscal policy more unlikely? In other words, does the occurrence of election-induced cycles in particular spending categories depend on definitions of a new democracy? Veiga and Pinho (2007) evaluate this issue using the alloc”
Fighting with one hand tied behind the back: political budget cycles in the West German states (2009, background): “Incumbents could increase spending on election-relevant items while reducing spending on other items (Drazen and Eslava 2005, 2006; Veiga and Veiga 2007).”
Decentralization and Local Governments' Performance: How Does Fiscal Autonomy Affect Spending Efficiency? (2012, unknown): “The relevant aspect of our results compared to the existing evidence on the “electoral budget cycle” in local governments (e.g., Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Bartolini and Santolini, 2009) is that they clarify that the observed increase in municipal spending when close to new elections can be interpreted…”
Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities (2008, methodology): “This result is analogous to that found by Veiga & Veiga (2007b) and by Akhmedov & Zhuravskaya (2004), and suggests that Brazilian voters are receptive to both higher expenditures executed along the years preceding elections and positive changes of expenditures in election years.”
Opportunistic and partisan election cycles in Brazil: new evidence at the municipal level (2011, methodology): “Veiga & Veiga (2007) evaluated a panel composed of Portuguese municipalities during the 1979-2001 period and identified decreases in budget balance and local taxes and also increases in expenditures in election years, especially investment expenditures.”
Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? (2010, unknown): “In studies of developing countries and/or ‘new’ democracies, Veiga and Veiga (2007) use a data set for Portuguese mainland municipalities for the period 1979–2001 and find that elections lead to a rise in ‘visible’ investment expenditures (e.g., other buildings) and to a decline in less ‘visible’…”
Political Cycles in Public Expenditure: Butter vs Guns (2017, background): “A number of studies lend empirical support to this prediction using either multi-county panel data ( Schuknecht, 20 0 0; Vergne, 20 09; Katsimi and Sarantides, 2012 ) or data for local government elections ( Schneider, 2010; Veiga and Veiga, 2007 ).”
Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, background): “Second, it could be interesting to examine if PBCs are stronger in the case of simultaneous elections (see Veiga and Veiga 2007a, for a first attempt in Portugal).”
The political economy of intergovernmental grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy (2007, background): “28Veiga and Veiga’s (2007) empirical results reveal the opportunistic behaviour of the Portuguese mayors, who increase, in pre-electoral periods, expenditure items highly visible to the electorate, such as investment expenditures on overpasses, streets and complementary works, and rural roads.”
The Determinants of Local Government's Financial Transparency (2011, background): “Folster ( 2002 ), Veiga and Veiga ( 2007 ), Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya ( 2007 ) and Ferris et al .”
Public spending interactions and local politics. Empirical evidence from French municipalities (2008, background): “…on local political business cycles, see Blais and Nadeau (1992), Rosenberg (1992), Strate et al. (1993), Bhattacharyya and Wassmer (1995), Kneebone and McKenzie (2001), Petterson-Lidbom (2001), Galli and Rossi (2002), Besley and Case (2003), Coelho et al. (2006), and Veiga and Veiga (2007).”