OPTIMAL AUCTION WITH RESALE

By C. Zheng. 2002

153 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3f198cef5b757a50ea8a973bcd3147fa4f1c8e50

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Thomas Tröger
2. Giacomo Calzolari
3. Rodney J. Garratt
4. Alessandro Pavan

In Marketing

1. Thomas Tröger
2. Giacomo Calzolari
3. Rodney J. Garratt
4. Alessandro Pavan

In Safety Research

1. Thomas Tröger
2. Giacomo Calzolari
3. Rodney J. Garratt
4. Alessandro Pavan

Citations in the corpus

• Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale (2006, background): “Zheng (2002) considers mechanism-design of the initial seller in (possibly asymmetric) private-value environments when she cannot prevent resale.”
• Monopoly with Resale (2006, background): “Precisely, suppose it is always the winner who sets the price in the resale bargaining game (cfr Zheng, 2002).”