Asymmetric networks in two-sided markets

140 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Failure to Launch: Critical Mass in Platform Businesses (2010, unknown): “12 Notable theoretical contributions include Ambrus and Argenziano (2009), Armstrong (2006), Caillaud and Julien (2003), Hagiu (2006), and Weyl (2008a, 2010); see Rochet and Tirole (2006) for an overview.”
Information and Two-Sided Platform Profits (2014, background): “(1) Thus, demand on each side depends positively on the expectation of participation on the other side: users expect nd developers to join and developers expect n e u users to join.”
Perfect Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection (2017, background): “The most closely related paper is Ambrus and Argenziano (2009), who applied “Nash equilibrium in coalitionally rationalizable strategies” to a two-sided markets model.”
Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation (2015, background): “As in much of the literature on competing multi-sided platforms (e.g. Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Armstrong and Wright (2007), and Ambrus and Argenziano (2009)), there are often multiple equilibria in the continuation game following given fees and investment levels set by the two intermediaries.”