Ultimate ownership and control in Russia

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Institutional Investors and Institutional Environment: A Comparative Analysis and Review (2010, background): “The agency and information asymmetry problems that result could be partially ameliorated by institutional investors who could monitor management, but many emerging country governments discourage such monitoring (Chernykh, 2007; Fan and Wong, 2002; Kao et al., 2004).”
Institutions and Organizational Structure: The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids (2013, background): “They are often observed in transitional economies such as China, Hungary (Voska, 1993), Russia (Chernykh, 2008), Czech Republic and Slovak Republic (OECD, 2005).”
State Control and Corporate Governance in Transition Economies: 25 Years on from 1989 (2016, unknown): “Adding indirect state ownership increases the proportion of publicly listed companies controlled by the state from 14.1 percent to 37 percent with a conservative 50 percent control threshold and to 57.5 percent with a 25 percent control threshold (Chernykh, 2008).”