Training and Union Wages

By Christian Dustmann, Uta Schnberg. Review of Economics and Statistics, 2004

165 citations recorded by the source corpus.

This paper investigates whether unions, through imposing wage floors that lead to wage compression, increase on-the-job training. Our analysis focuses on Germany. Based on a model of unions and firm-financed training, we derive empirical implications regarding apprenticeship training intensity, layoffs, wage cuts, and wage compression in unionized and nonunionized firms. We test these implications using firm panel data matched with administrative employee data. We find support for the hypothesis that union recognition, via imposing minimum wages and wage compression, increases training in apprenticeship programs.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Public Administration

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3d3eb5943eacd8d6692bd23fbb35944dba316513

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Ricarda Schmidl
2. Núria Rodríguez-Planas
3. Werner Eichhorst
4. Klaus F. Zimmermann

In Public Administration

1. Ricarda Schmidl
2. Werner Eichhorst

Citations in the corpus

• A Road Map to Vocational Education and Training in Industrialized Countries (2015, background): “…and complementarity between ability and training in the production function (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998); or 2) search costs combined with market frictions such as collective bargaining, minimum wages, and firing costs, which are higher for high-skilled workers (Dustmann and schönberg 2009).”