Efficiency Costs of Meeting Industry-Distributional Constraints Under Environmental Permits and Taxes

By A. Bovenberg, L. Goulder, Derek J. Gurney. 2003

125 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3d2491406de9130ad5d62659c92e8b51b3e46e80

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy (2008, background): “In particular, even 100 percent free allowance allocation may not be enough to compensate firms when the proportionate emissions reduction is very large (Bovenberg et al. 2005).”
Carbon Tax or Carbon Permits: The Impact on Generators’ Risks (2008, unknown): “Bovenberg and Goulder (2001), Burtraw et al. (2002) and Burtraw and Palmer (2007) discuss the level of free allocation that would be needed to maintain profit levels and asset values in the US electricity industry.”
How do low-carbon policies promote green diffusion among alliance-based firms in China? An evolutionary-game model of complex networks (2019, background): “The other category is a new economic instrument that emphasizes the use of market mechanisms to address problems related to externalities, including carbon trading rights as well as the emissions trading system (Bovenberg et al., 2003; Zhao et al., 2017).”
Compliance Strategies under Permits for Emissions (2007, unknown): “In presence of Cournot competition in the output market, firms in a relatively clean industry can, in fact, benefit from a reduction in the number of available permits, running counter to the common wisdom that an increasing stringency is detrimental to firm profitability (also see Bovenberg et al. ”
Markets for Pollution Allowances: What Are the (New) Lessons? (2013, unknown): “The Clean Air Act's sulfur dioxide allowance trading market offers yet The Clean Air Act's sulfur dioxide allowance trading market offers yet another case where the cap-and-trade system was vulnerable to other regulations, another case where the cap-and-trade system was vulnerable to other regulatio”