Inductive Risk and Values in Science

By Heather Douglas. Philosophia Scientiæ, 2000

726 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: History and Philosophy of Science, Sociology and Political Science, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3c123bf62763d45c2c55fc06365dc2142103a729

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In History and Philosophy of Science

1. Matthew J. Brown
2. Torsten Wilholt
3. Atoosa Kasirzadeh

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Matthew J. Brown
2. Torsten Wilholt
3. Atoosa Kasirzadeh

In Philosophy

1. Matthew J. Brown
2. Torsten Wilholt
3. Atoosa Kasirzadeh

Citations in the corpus

• Epistemic Trust in Science (2013, methodology): “In an example described by Douglas ([2000]), it is the examination of individual slices of rat livers for signs of tumors, and in particular the fashion in which researchers deal with the many borderline cases in assessing them, that the inductive risk of”
• Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk (2013, background): “” Heather Douglas has revived Rudner’s (1953) and Hempel’s (1965) version of the argument for the value-ladenness of science.”
• Reasons, Values, Stakeholders: A Philosophical Framework for Explainable Artificial Intelligence (2021, background): “Figure 5 Arguments for inherently significant value assumptions in scientific and AI inferences have been thoroughly discussed in the philosophical literature (see, for example, [70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76]).”