Domestic violence and women's autonomy in developing countries: theory and evidence
By M. Eswaran, Nisha Malhotra. 2011
282 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, Gender Studies
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3b9e81ce3e95e77abf5b8569e312c0fe0996bf8f
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Demography
- Matthias Doepke
- Michèle Tertilt
- Alessandra Voena
- Amber Peterman
- Melissa Hidrobo
- Shalini Roy
- Charles I. Jones
In Gender Studies
- Matthias Doepke
- Michèle Tertilt
- Alessandra Voena
- Melissa Hidrobo
- Amber Peterman
- John Hoddinott
- Akhter U. Ahmed
- Shalini Roy
Citations in the corpus
- Women’s Access to Labor Market Opportunities, Control of Household Resources, and Domestic Violence: Evidence from Bangladesh (2014, unknown): “Theoretical household bargaining models show how a woman’s access to economic opportunities can either decrease or increase violence, depending on her initial level of bargaining power (Tauchen, Witte, and Long 1991; Rao 1997; Eswaran and Malhotra 2011).”
- A Mixed-Method Review of Cash Transfers and Intimate Partner Violence in Low- and Middle-Income Countries (2018, background): “However, variants of the bargaining model also predict that an increase in women’s resources may put a woman at increased risk of IPV if men feel threatened and use violence to reassert authority in the relationship (Eswaran and Malhotra 2011).”
- The Economics and Politics of Women's Rights (2012, background): “Eswaran and Malhotra (2011), in contrast, find that more female autonomy increases domestic violence in India, as men use violence to increase their bargaining power.”
- Resources and Intimate Partner Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa (2017, unknown): “More generally, resources can be predicted to increase the risk of violence for women if their initial bargaining power is low (Tauchen et al., 1991; Eswaran and Malhotra, 2011; Heath, 2012).”
- The Effect of Cash, Vouchers, and Food Transfers on Intimate Partner Violence: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Northern Ecuador (2016, unknown): “However, when violence is either instrumental and used to control the victim’s behavior or allocation of resources within the household ( Eswaran and Malhotra 2011; Tauchen, Witte, and Long 1991 , or extractive and used to extract monetary transfers from the victim or her family ( Bloch and Rao…”
- Transfers, Behavior Change Communication, and Intimate Partner Violence: Postprogram Evidence from Rural Bangladesh (2019, background): “…resources from their partners (Bloch & Rao, 2002; Bobonis et al., 2013) or ensure that resource allocation is aligned with their preferences (Eswaran & Malhotra, 2011), or if men increase violence as backlash against the change in power dynamics (Chin, 2012), the literature has found…”