13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown
By Arvind Kumar Jain. 2011
250 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3b4ba05775ebccb5b4a7da502a0a72d1b48c3fc3
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Arvind Subramanian
- A. Baker
- M. Kessler
- Dani Rodrik
- Michael J. Hiscox
- Yotam Margalit
- Jens Hainmueller
- Andrew K. Rose
In Finance
In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- The Hyperglobalization of Trade and Its Future (2013, background): “Th e savings glut hypothesis is by no means uncontested; many economists argue that monetary and regulatory policies in borrowing countries should bear the brunt of responsibility (Johnson and Kwak 2010 and Haldane 2010).”
- The Dark Side of NY–LON: Financial Centres and the Global Financial Crisis (2013, unknown): “…deposit-taking banks to develop investment banking business; the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 left derivatives and OTC markets unregulated; while the Financial Services Authority in the UK maintained a flexible regulation regime, relying on self-regulation (Johnson and Kwak, 2010).”
- The Great Mortgaging: Housing Finance, Crises, and Business Cycles (2014, unknown): “∗The views expressed herein are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.”
- Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises (2012, unknown): “Indeed, Johnson and Kwak (2010) notably identify thirteen banks (and their bankers).”
- The New Political Economy of the Macroprudential Ideational Shift (2013, background): “…a qualitatively different form, in a fashion which should empower regulators and reduce the capacity of private actors to drive the regulatory debate in the fashion witnessed during the period in which the efficient markets position was ascendant (Johnson and Kwak 2010; Baker 2010; Tsingou 2008).”