Risk Rationing and Wealth Effects in Credit Markets

By S. Boucher, Michael Carter, C. Guirkinger. 2005

337 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3a8358a8ace4246b6f15299c4a158dd831826c8b

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Citations in the corpus

Credit Constraints and Productivity in Peruvian Agriculture (2007, background): “A second contribution of this article is to take up the suggestion of several recent articles (Boucher et al., 2008; Gilligan et al., 2005) that argue for a broader conceptual definition of credit constraints.”
Informal lending amongst friends and relatives: Can microcredit compete in rural China? (2010, background): “or not. On this latter point Boucher et al (2008) argue that even the clarification of”
Direct Elicitation of Credit Constraints: Conceptual and Practical Issues with an Application to Peruvian Agriculture (2009, background): “As pointed out by several studies (Jappelli 1990; Mushinski 1999; Boucher et al. 2008), even though an agent both has positive notional demand and faces a positive supply, he may not have positive effective demand, defined as the demand for contracts available in the “actually existing” or…”
Productivity, credit, risk, and the demand for weather index insurance in smallholder agriculture in Ethiopia (2013, background): “In short many farmers seem to be risk rationed in the terminology of Boucher et al. (2008). This risk arises because the incentive constraints against morally hazardous behavior require the lender to leave substantial risk on the borrower, and if a sufficient component of that risk is outside the co”
Where and how index insurance can boost the adoption of improved agricultural technologies (2016, unknown): “[2] dub risk rationing.”
Measuring risk attitudes among Mozambican farmers (2014, background): “When economists attempt to measure risk preferences, they typically assume that risk preferences follow the constant relative risk assumption (CRRA) utility function (see Cardenas and Carpenter (2008), Hurley (2010) or Delavande et al. (2011) for recent reviews of the literature). However, the conse”
Land Registration, Governance, and Development : Evidence and Implications for Policy (2009, background): “…also be limited by the availability of promising “bankable” projects as well as the scope for “risk rationing”, that is the fact that potential credit-worthy borrowers are unwilling to use titles for fear of losing them in case their project is unsuccessful (Boucher, Carter, and Guirkinger 2008).”
Rural Women’s Access to Financial Services: Credit, Savings, and Insurance (2014, background): “…averse are less likely to adopt new technologies, to undertake projects that are expected to offer higher profits but expose them to more risk, or to apply for loans that may cause them to lose the collateral they own (Liu, 2008; Dercon, 2006; Boucher et al., 2008, and; Fletschner et al., 2009).”
Impacts of land certification on tenure security, investment, and land markets: evidence from Ethiopia (2008, background): “At the same time, for credit effects from formal registration to materialize, households will need to have otherwise bankable projects, be credit-worthy, and willing to take the associated risk (Boucher et al. 2008).”
The Impacts of Public Investment in and for Agriculture: Synthesis of the Existing Evidence (2012, background): “Under such contracts , agricultural credit markets can face the same moral hazard and adverse selection problems that agricultural insurance markets face ( Boucher , Carter , and Guirkinger 2008 ; Besley 1994 ) .”
Impact of Access to Credit on Agricultural Productivity: Evidence from Smallholder Cassava Farmers in Nigeria (2015, background): “On the demand side, apart from the situations where farmers may not have adequate collateral, even in situations where credit is available, farmers may find it too risky to borrow (Boucher et al., 2008).”