Temporary Migration and Economic Assimilation
By Christian Dustmann. Social Science Research Network, 2000
146 citations recorded by the source corpus.
In this paper, I study temporary migrations, and its consequences for immigrants’ behaviour. I distinguish between temporary migrations where the return time is exogenous, and temporary migrations where the migrant chooses when to return. I then illustrate the consequences both types of temporary migration have for migrants’ behaviour (as opposed to a permanent migration). If migrations are non-permanent, then this has also consequences for the way empirical models need to be specified. The problems arising for empirical work are discussed in the second part of the paper. Finally, I summarise some empirical evidence which is consistent with the hypothesis that the behaviour of temporary migrants is different from that of migrants with permanent migration intentions.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3a56ca72dfbabe62638078b117904b3ecd421ea0
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Christian Dustmann
- Govert E. Bijwaard
- Lena Nekby
- A. Glitz
- Catalina Amuedo‐Dorantes
- Alan Manning
- Kalena E. Cortes
- Stephen Drinkwater
In Sociology and Political Science
- Christian Dustmann
- Govert E. Bijwaard
- A. Glitz
- Lena Nekby
- Stephen Drinkwater
- Catalina Amuedo‐Dorantes
- Kalena E. Cortes
- Alan Manning
Citations in the corpus
- The Economic Situation of First and Second-Generation Immigrants in France, Germany and the United Kingdom (2010, background): “…very important and other research suggests that time in the country seems to have an independent effect on earnings, Chiswick (1978) being the classic reference but see also Borjas (1985), Dustmann (1993, 2000) and Lubotsky (2007) for a discussion of the potential biases in these estimates.”
- The emigration of immigrants, return vs onward migration: evidence from Sweden (2006, background): “…Borjas 1987, 1989; Borjas and Bratsberg 1996; Constant and Massey 2003; Constant and Zimmermann 2003; DaVanzo 1983; Devortex and Ituralde 2000; Dustmann 2000, 2003; Duleep 1994; Edin et al. 2000; Jasso and Rosenzweig 1982; Klinthäll 1998, 1999; Lindstrom and Massey 1994; Longva 2001; Pedersen…”
- Children and return migration (2003, background): “These are results which have been studied before (see for instance Dustmann 1997 ).”
- On the Economics and Politics of Refugee Migration (2017, unknown): “Consequently, as emphasized by Dustmann (1993, 1999, 2000), whether and how much a migrant chooses to invest into country-specific human capital depends greatly on the migrant’s perception of the likelihood of future settlement in the host country.”
- Immigrant migration dynamics model for The Netherlands (2010, background): “If migration is viewed as an investment decision to maximize human capital and/or earnings over the lifetime, then return and repetitive migration are not anomalies but common outcomes of a migration decision (see Dustmann 1995, 2000, 2002; Borjas and Bratsberg 1996).”
- Labor Market Assimilation of Recent Immigrants in Spain (2006, background): “Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, it is possible that the upward occupational mobility associated to longer residencies in the host country is the by-product of a positive immigrant selection taking place via return migration (Dustmann, 1999, 2000).”
- Are Refugees Different from Economic Immigrants? Some Empirical Evidence on the Heterogeneity of Immigrant Groups in the United States (2004, background): “Dustmann (1997, 1999, 2000) compares migrants who intend to remain only temporarily in the host country with migrants who stay permanently, and nds that they exhibit different labor market behaviors.”
- The labour-market performance of recent migrants (2008, background): “The higher purchasing power that overseas earnings give migrants in their home country can mean that they will have lower reservation wages and hence be willing to accept lower wage offers (Dustmann, 2000).”