Fiscal Institutions, Credit Ratings, and Borrowing Costs

By Craig L. Johnson, Kenneth A. Kriz. 2005

196 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3a4029f3b8e13c85bbf143b19f949f7e96a129a4

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In Economics and Econometrics

Citations in the corpus

Second-Generation Fiscal Rules; Balancing Simplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability (2018, background): “…sovereign spreads and decrease the response of spreads to fiscal variables— after taking into account the fiscal and macroeconomic characteristics of countries (Bayoumi, Goldstein, and Woglom 1995; Poterba and Rueben 1999; Johnson and Kriz 2005; IMF 2009; Iara and Wolff 2010; Feld and others 2017).”
Fool the Markets? Creative Accounting, Fiscal Transparency and Sovereign Risk Premia (2006, unknown): “Johnson and Kriz (2005) show that expenditure limits and stricter balanced budget rules lower interest costs because they lower the credit risk.”
Developing a Method to Assessing the Municipal Financial Health (2013, background): “…examined through research which indicators are most relevant to provide a specific rating for the assessed entities (Auroles et al., 1996; Benito et al., 2003; Copeland & Ingram, 1982; Horton, 1970; Johnson & Kenneth, 2005; Michel, 1977; Morton & McLeavey, 1978; Raman, 1981; Simonsen et al., 2001).”
Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU (2008, unknown): “Johnson and Kriz (2005) show that expenditure limits and stricter balanced budget rules lower interest costs because they lower the credit risk.”
Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses - The Swiss Experience (2013, unknown): “Compared to the survey-based studies, Johnson and Kriz (2005) is the only paper studying the effects of US state fiscal rules using actual financial market data.”