Collateral Damage: Effects of the Japanese Bank Crisis on Real Activity in the United States
By J. Peek, Eric S. Rosengren. 2000
1,123 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/3a3cc06a0b40c7a667a05547feafdca63426b3c3
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Luc Laeven
- Thorsten Beck
- Stijn Claessens
- José-Luis Peydró
- L. Gambacorta
- Allen N. Berger
- Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
- Steven R. G. Ongena
In Finance
- Luc Laeven
- Stijn Claessens
- Thorsten Beck
- Allen N. Berger
- José-Luis Peydró
- Neeltje van Horen
- Steven R. G. Ongena
- Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
Citations in the corpus
- Bank Mergers and Crime: The Real and Social Effects of Credit Market Competition (2004, positive): “Several recent studies (Peek and Rosengren (2000), Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002), and Burgess and Pande (2003)) tie credit market imperfections to diminished real economic activity and growth.”
- Exporting Sovereign Stress: Evidence from Syndicated Bank Lending during the Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis (2015, background): “…negative shocks to their capital both domestically (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, and Saurina, 2012) as well as across borders (Peek and Rosengren, 2000; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; De Haas and Van Horen, 2012; Giannetti and Laeven, 2012a; Claessens, Tong, and Wei, 2012;…”
- Liquidity flows and fragility of business enterprises (2003, background): “f(hL )+ hL − (1 − β(1 − ν(hL|H)))x =0 . ( 30 )”
- The Employment Effects of Credit Market Disruptions: Firm-level Evidence from the 2008–9 Financial Crisis (2014, background): “…small versus large literature, necessarily restrict attention to firms that have regulatory filings with borrower-level information.2 Conversely, Peek and Rosengren (2000) and Ashcraft (2005) find that local areas affected by banking distress have reduced economic activity, but they cannot…”
- Cyclicality of Credit Supply: Firm Level Evidence (2014, background): “Notably, Peek and Rosengren (2000) look at the contraction in the U.S. credit supply caused by Japanese banks in the context of the Japanese crisis in the early 1990s.”
- The Flight Home Effect: Evidence from the Syndicated Loan Market During Financial Crises (2012, background): “Existing research has shown that banks transmit negative shocks to their capital both domestically (Kashyap and Stein, 2000) and internationally (Peek and Rosengren, 2000; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2009, 2011; Popov and Udell, 2009; Schnabl, 2011) and some contraction in international bank lending…”
- Bank Liquidity Creation and Real Economic Output (2017, positive): “This is suggested by results in ajan and Zingales (1998) , who find that firms in manufacturingased industries which are more dependent on external financing row faster in countries with developed financial systems.”
- How Much Do Idiosyncratic Bank Shocks Affect Investment? Evidence from Matched Bank-Firm Loan Data (2017, background): “For example, the work of Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000), Klein et al. (2002), Khwaja andMian (2008), Paravisini (2008), Amiti andWeinstein (2011), Jimenez et al. (2011), Santos (2011), Greenstone andMas (2012), and ChodorowReich (2014) provide bank-level or matched bank-firm-level evidence that…”
- Macroprudential Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers, and Credit Supply: Evidence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments (2017, background): “Their damaging real effects (Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)) have generated a broad agreement among academics and policymakers that financial regulation needs to get a macroprudential dimension that aims to lessen the negative externalities from the financial to the macro real sector, as in a credit cru”
- The role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy (2012, background): “In a subsequent study, Peek and Rosengren (1995b) focus on the direct impact of the enforcement of capital regulations by bank supervisors on the ability of capital-constrained banks to lend, and thus to be able to increase loans in response to an easing of monetary policy.”