Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts
By Daniel Stoljar. 2005
186 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/39fdd9efaff441536e8db675dfd818042884a765
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- B. Veillet
- Peter Carruthers
- Katalin Balog
- Elisabeth Pacherie
- John A. Bargh
- Henk Aarts
- David F. Feldon
- Thomas K. Metzinger
In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
- B. Veillet
- Peter Carruthers
- Katalin Balog
- K. Stanovich
- Jonathan Evans
- Gary Lupyan
- Keith Frankish
- Manolo Martínez
In Philosophy
- B. Veillet
- Peter Carruthers
- Katalin Balog
- Elisabeth Pacherie
- John A. Bargh
- Henk Aarts
- David F. Feldon
- Thomas K. Metzinger
Citations in the corpus
- The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology (2011, background): “…alike) acknowledges the crucial role that these concepts play in the explanation of explanatory gaps, inverted-experience thought-experiments, and so forth (Loar 1990; Chalmers 1996, 2007; Balog 1999; Carruthers 2000; Tye 2000; Papineau 2002; Stoljar 2005; Carruthers and Veillet 2007; Levine 2007).”
- Acquaintance and the mind-body problem (2012, methodology): “Here I propose to follow an approach – dubbed by Stoljar (2005) the “phenomenal concepts strategy” – that answers this new version of Chalmer’s argument as well as other dualist arguments14 by proposing a physicalist account of phenomenal concepts.”